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HOW “COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL
STATES” BECAME “INTERSTATE
COMMERCE,” AND WHY IT MATTERS
Conrad J. Weiler, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
A. OUTLINE
This Introduction briefly discusses the significance of the
Constitutional “[p]ower . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among
the several states” and argues that this, the actual language of the
Constitution, was understood to have and has a broader meaning
than the nearly universally accepted but quite unoriginal
substitute language, “interstate commerce.” Part I considers the
first major interpretation of the actual words of the Constitution,
in Gibbons v. Ogden,1 and then discusses the origins and meanings
of the later invented and adopted terms “interstate” and
“intrastate.” Part II presents data on the frequency of usage of all
these terms in all Court majority opinions since 1789, and shows
how “interstate commerce” has overwhelmingly been the term
used by the Supreme Court since shortly after its introduction in
1869, being used about ten times more in majority opinions
concerning the power to regulate commerce among the several
states since roughly 1910 than the actual constitutional language.
* Associate Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, Temple
University. The author is indebted to (now) Dr. Matthew Smetona of Temple University
for very helpful early research assistance, to the late Dr. David Adamany, Esq., Stephanie
Kosta, Esq., and Prof. Jeffrey Dunoff of the Beasley School of Law for assistance and to
the Department of Political Science and Temple University for support and time for this
research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Pennsylvania Political
Science Association in 2012, the Midwest Political Science Association Convention in 2015
and were uploaded to SSRN. Comments from Prof. John Kincaid, Director of the Meyner
Center at Lafayette College, Lauren Rowlands, ABD, and members of the Temple
Political Science faculty and graduate student association, and significant editorial advice
from Prof. Jill Hasday were also very helpful, though the author is obviously solely
responsible for the content of the article.
1. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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Part III presents the research methodology. Part IV first analyses
key Court opinions over the last century, including modern
originalist analyses, to show how the use of “interstate commerce”
has led or allowed the Court to take what is arguably a narrower
view of the power than is warranted by the actual language of the
Constitution, in turn necessitating greater than necessary resort to
commerce power-extending doctrines such as the affecting
commerce test and the necessary and proper clause. Then it
considers past and modern academic analyses of the power over
commerce based on the “interstate commerce” gloss, including
several contemporary analyses that present themselves as
originalist. Part VI discusses the dangers of reliance on commerce
power-extending doctrines resulting from dependence on the
“interstate commerce” power. Part VII is a brief conclusion.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE
COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES AND ITS
DEFINITION
The potential significance of this study stems first from the
fact that giving the national government a power to regulate
commerce was among the most important reasons for creating the
Constitution in the first place, and has remained among its most
important powers. Second, beginning with the so-called Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887,2 and especially since the New Deal, the
power to regulate commerce among the several states has become
the main source of numerous federal regulations governing wide
aspects of American life, from regulating civil rights in the private
sector for minorities, women, the disabled, the elderly and other
groups in employment, housing, protecting the environment,
including air, soil, wetlands, water and endangered species, as well
as workplace safety, financial regulation, regulating much of
health care, fighting organized crime, regulating harmful as well
as helpful drugs, and protecting food, product and consumer
safety, among others. Third, conservatives and some originalists
have argued that the “interstate commerce” power is not strong
enough to support this legislation and is too broadly construed.
Thus, because of the importance of the power to regulate
commerce among the states for American domestic policy, the
2. This is the popular name of the act, not the official title, which to some extent
demonstrates our point. See infra pp. 441, 453–55, 457–58, 486, and accompanying notes,
and notes 44 and 64.
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interpretation of the meaning of each of the words of the power—
and especially of a gloss like “interstate commerce” is very
important to constitutional law and to society generally.
Over the years, the Court has developed three main
approaches to the power over commerce among the states, one
dealing with instrumentalities and channels of commerce, another
dealing with persons and things in commerce, and a third dealing
with activities affecting commerce.3 Within those categories this
article focuses only on the question of whether and to what extent
the use of the actual language of the Constitution—“among the
several states” versus the neologisms “interstate” and
“intrastate”—affects the perception or definition of the actual
extent of the power within the last category, things affecting
commerce.
On the one hand, this article argues that generally the
“interstate commerce power” is itself seen narrowly as limited to
regulation of commerce—however defined4—that is in the
process of crossing state boundaries only, and thus the power
often needs considerable assistance from various commerceextending doctrines if it is going to reach activity inside states.
This extension of the Constitutional gloss has long been criticized,
especially by modern conservative originalists. On the other hand,
I argue that the power actually in the Constitution, to regulate
commerce among the several states, by definition can regulate
certain activity inside states, particularly activity that is not
directly in the process of crossing state lines, as long as it affects
more states than one, thus reaching a potentially wider range of
activities without need or as much need of the assistance of
extending doctrines and reaching even further with the aid of such
doctrines. While the latter is a highly disputed issue which for
space reasons we cannot deal with fully, this article argues that the

3. Chief Justice Rehnquist well summarized most of this doctrine in United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–60 (1995), though he did so entirely within the linguistic
framework of “interstate commerce.” See infra, pp. 461–63.
4. Though the meaning of individual words of the power are contested, they could
be somewhat interdependent in their effects. A broad interpretation of the terms
“regulate” or “commerce,” for example, could counter to some extent the effect of a
narrow interpretation of “among the several states,” and vice versa. Along these lines
Balkin argues that restrictions on the meaning of “commerce” are sometimes actually
restrictions on “among.” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, 181–82 (2011). For
limited discussion of the definition of “commerce” see infra pp. 433, 456–57, 459–461, 464–
65, 468–71, and 482–85, and notes 13, 17, 95.
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dominance of “interstate commerce” over the actual
constitutional language has supported a narrower than justified
meaning of the power over commerce among the several states,
including supporting the narrow meaning argued by some
conservative and originalist Justices and academicians.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE WORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND THEIR SUBSTITUTES
A. INTRODUCTION
As the data in Part III demonstrate, the actual constitutional
language “commerce . . . among the several states” has long been
largely supplanted on the Court by the phrase “interstate
commerce,” and the latter has long been normally used generally
in law and society to refer to the power over commerce among the
several states on the largely unexamined assumption that the two
are the same. In this section we explore the origins and meanings
of the original language of the Constitution and of the term
“interstate commerce,” as well as its reinforcing complement
“intrastate.” Because of space considerations, we cannot fully
examine the debate over the origins or meaning of “among the
several states,” but merely sketch out two basic contrasting
contentions as to the meaning, and then examine these
contentions in light of our data.
B. “AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES”
Gaining a power to regulate foreign commerce was one of
the chief motives for the calling of the Constitutional Convention,
as its absence from the Articles of Confederation proved to be a
major weakness for the new nation. This power was granted in
Convention with little or no controversy over the power itself, but
extensive controversy prevailed over whether it would be
exercised by a two-thirds or a simple majority. The chief
opposition to a simple majority was from Southern delegates who
feared that it would allow a Northern majority to burden their
slave-labor-based exports as well as perhaps squeeze out slavery
itself. The issue was resolved when concessions were made to the
South over slavery, though some continued to advocate for the
supermajority requirement both in Convention and then later in
some Southern ratifying conventions. The power over commerce
among the several states was recognized as necessary in itself as
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well as to complement the power over foreign commerce and thus
was added, again with little controversy over the power itself, but
with considerable controversy over the size of the majority to
exercise it. A power over Indian commerce was already in the
Articles of Confederation and was brought forward into the
Constitution with no debate, but with simplified language.5
As noted above, the power over commerce among the
several states is among the most important as well as contested
powers in the Constitution. Briefly, the key debates are over
whether the power to regulate includes the power to prohibit,
whether commerce is only buying and selling or something
broader, perhaps as broad as all productive or gainful activity,
whether the three parts of the power have the same extent, and
regarding the part we are concerned with here, “among the
several states,” the debate, in sum, concerns whether this phrase
purports to extend federal power to some activities inside states
or is more narrowly limited only to activities which cross state
boundaries.
This latter debate originated in differing political views of the
appropriate scope of the power over commerce among the states,
but also in occasional usage of the term “between the states” in
the Framing era, a term which actually conveys the narrower
meaning of only covering activities crossing state boundaries. In
the early Republic, the narrow “between” meaning of “among”
was often advocated by those in favor of states’ rights and a
weaker federal power, often in the defense of state control over
slavery as an internal matter, since the national power over
commerce was recognized as perhaps the chief danger to the
peculiar institution.6 However, the meaning of “among the several
states” was not considered in detail by the Supreme Court until
the foundational 1824 case, Gibbons v. Ogden, which ironically
had nothing to do with slavery.
C. GIBBONS V. OGDEN
Gibbons v. Ogden concerned a long-disputed New York state
monopoly of the business of ferrying passengers by steamboat
across the Hudson River between Manhattan and northern New
5.
6.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, § 4.
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC, 43 (2001) and 1
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 47, 281 (1953),
among others.
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Jersey granted to Ogden.7 Gibbons, on the other hand, had a
federal coasting license under the federal Coasting Act of 1793,
and claimed that this gave him the right to also operate a ferry
between Manhattan and New Jersey regardless of the New York
monopoly. Among other arguments, Ogden’s counsel asserted
that the power over commerce among the several states extended
to commerce only when it crossed a state line, while activity inside
a state was left to the state to regulate, and he often characterized
the power as “between” the states.8 This “between” interpretation
was an early version of the “interstate” theory that is our central
concern.
In striking down the New York monopoly because it
conflicted with the federal coasting license, Marshall directly
addressed the meaning of “among” in the phrase, “commerce
among the several states.” Marshall made quite clear that the
word “among” meant to go inside states: “The word “among”
means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is
intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop
at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced
into the interior.”9
In direct rebuttal to Ogden’s “between” meaning of
“among,” Marshall made clear that the state line was not the limit
of the power of Congress:
But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several
States. . . . This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when
applied to commerce “among the several States.” They either
join each other, in which case they are separated by a
mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in
7. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). For historical background see HERBERT A. JOHNSON, GIBBONS
v. OGDEN: JOHN MARSHALL, STEAMBOATS, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (2010)
[hereinafter JOHNSON, GIBBONS], and THOMAS H. COX, GIBBONS V. OGDEN, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2009). Ironically, the preface to each book
anachronistically describes the case as dealing with “interstate commerce,” which
demonstrates our thesis by linguistically assuming away much of the point of Marshall’s
opinion. COX, supra, at ix; JOHNSON, GIBBONS, supra, at xiii and infra note 13.
8. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 64–65.
9. Marshall both went beyond and largely ignored much of what the parties argued.
Marshall gave no attention to the extensive discussion by the parties of the intellectual
property clause, and bypassed whether the federal power was exclusive or concurrent,
though Justice Johnson’s concurrence did address the latter. Nor did the parties spend
much time addressing the meaning of “among” or “several states,” which Marshall
obviously did. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194–96 (emphasis added). Concerning “mingle,” see
infra, pp. 434–36, 459, 461, 462, 464, 468–69, 470, 473, 480, 490, 492, and note 13.

4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

7/11/19 6:28 PM

“AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES”

335

which case other States lie between them. What is commerce
“among” them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading
expedition between two adjoining States, commence and
terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be
between two States remote from each other, must it not
commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass
through a third? Commerce among the States must, of
necessity, be commerce with the States.10

To be sure, as Marshall continued, the power to go inside a
state would not grant federal power over “the purely internal
commerce of a state,” but it would extend to “that commerce
which affects more states than one,” i.e, “several.” (emphasis
added).11
Neither of the parties nor Marshall cited any dictionaries in
the case. However, Marshall’s definition of “among” and his
contrast of its meaning with that argued by Ogden corresponds
very closely to definitions in Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of
the English Language.12 Johnson first defined “between” as “[i]n
the intermediate space,” or “[f]rom one to another; noting
intercourse.” He listed several other definitions and then at the
end importantly said “[b]etween is properly used of two and
among of more; but perhaps this accuracy is not always observed.”
For “among” Johnson’s first definition was: “[m]ingled with;
placed with other persons or things; on every side.” “Mingle”
(from which “mingled” derives), he first defined as: “[t]o mix; to
join; to compound; to unite with something so as to make one
10. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193–94 (emphasis added). See infra note 13 on Marshall’s use
of the term “intercourse” and supra note 4.
11. By referring to “commerce which affects more states than one” Marshall
arguably was not introducing the “affecting commerce” test per se, but referring to the
“several states” part of the power, the term “several” requiring by definition that the
commerce in question be among or inside more states than one. The “inside” meaning of
“among” necessitates the term “several” to avoid regulating commerce inside only one
state. In contrast, if the Constitution meant or said “between the several states,” as many
have argued, (see infra, pp. 466–68 and 482–485) by definition “between” requires at least
two states, making “several” redundant.
12. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755)
[hereinafter JOHNSON, DICTIONARY]. Here we partially follow the practice of originalists
on and off the Court who increasingly (though sometimes unsystematically) have cited
early dictionaries for constitutional meaning, preeminently Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary. See
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013), and Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States
Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77
(2010).
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mass,” and the second definition was “[c]onjoined with others, so
as to make part of the number,” all of which seem to mean being
inside of or a part of something. But regarding Johnson’s point at
the end of his definition of “between,” that the “accuracy”
between the two definitions was not always observed, his own
definitions of “between” and “among” themselves do differ
meaningfully. His definition of “between,” “[i]n the intermediate
space” clearly denotes being outside of whatever occupies the
spaces or entities that one is between, such as on a state boundary,
and “from one to another” similarly conveys the meaning of
crossing from one clearly defined unit to another across a
boundary. On the other hand, his definitions of “among,” i.e.,
“mingled with,” and especially “conjoined with others so as to
make part of the number,” or “one mass” clearly emphasize a very
different meaning of being inside of or part of a larger number or
whole.13
We recognize that our interpretation of Gibbons is disputed,
and we readily concede as noted below in Table 3 that the
Framers and the early Court often used the term “between” in
connection with “commerce among the several states,” which has
supported arguments that the Framers understood “among” to
actually mean only “between.”14 But, without fully exploring the
debate, it must be noted that “between” can very comfortably be
a lesser included meaning within the broad meaning of “among.”
If one is going inside more states than one to regulate commerce,
one usually also crosses state borders and thus goes “between”
states in order to go “among” them. Moreover, much federal
regulation of commerce does only concern commerce at the point
of crossing a state boundary. So the term “between” in itself could
well be or have been the precise term appropriate to describe the
actual activity or regulation in question in any given situation of
13. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY, supra note 12, (emphasis added), “between,” “mingle,”
and “among.” Note that Marshall’s use of “intercourse” in the passage quoted above is
also Dr. Johnson’s first definition of “commerce:” “[i]ntercourse; exchange of one thing
for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick.” Some modern conservative
originalists skip over “intercourse.” See infra notes 113 and 114.
14. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
CHI. L. REV., 101, 132–39 (2001) [hereinafter Original Meaning]; RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 301–02 (2004)
[hereinafter RESTORING], among others. While Barnett consulted Dr. Johnson’s
Dictionary regarding “commerce,” he did not for “among,” concluding on other grounds
that “among” must mean “between.” Original Meaning, 132–36. See, infra notes 144, 145,
and 168.
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being “in the intermediate space,” i.e., crossing a state boundary,
though crucially not defining the full reach of “among” in terms
of commerce inside of and affecting more states than one. In other
words, “between” is arguably a conception, or specific expected
application, but not the concept or full meaning of “among.”15 In
any event, though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this
article, we believe that there is ample additional originalist
evidence16 as well as Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons to support the
“inside” meaning of “among,” in contrast to the “crossing a state
line” or “between” meaning, and in contrast to the meaning of the
yet-to-be invented term that would eventually dominate the
entire topic, “interstate.”17
Within a few years of Gibbons, under new Chief Justice
Taney the Court began embracing views that, while not directly
repudiating the “inside” meaning of “among,” greatly limited the
ability of the Federal government to reach insides states under the
power over commerce. In three cases, Mayor of New York v.
Miln,18 the License Cases,19 and the Passenger Cases,20 the Court
found that transportation of persons into a state was not
commerce and was instead completely subject to the internal
police powers of the states over public health and welfare. (To be
sure, the Court recognized that the navigable waterways of the
United States themselves were partial exceptions to the
“between” limitation, so that commerce could be regulated inside
a state to the extent it was “navigation” to the port). Besides
excluding persons (once on land) from the federal regulation of
commerce, for presumably pro-slavery reasons, these opinions
took a very strong stand to try to exclude any conflict between
state police laws and federal commerce regulation, distinguishing
between what went between states and what went inside, so that
it seemed that there was a sharp and clear demarcation between
the two. In what has come to be called a “dual federalism”
15. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER of INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 119 (Antonin Scalia ed., 1997).
16. See infra pp. 476–79 and 482–83 for limited discussion.
17. As mentioned supra note 4, giving a broad meaning to one part of the power
could compensate for a narrow reading of another, and vice versa; consequently Marshall’s
broad definition of commerce as “intercourse” in Gibbons would also likely extend the
power inside states, though here our focus is upon “among” versus “interstate.” See supra
note 15.
18. 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
19. 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
20. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
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interpretation,21 the Taney Court seemed to say that if a state
were exerting its police powers inside itself, regardless of effects
on commerce among the states, i.e., on that commerce which the
federal government could otherwise regulate, there could be no
federal regulation. Thus under Taney the reach of the federal
power over commerce among the states was largely limited to that
which was “between” or was crossing state boundaries,22 and
while the Taney Court did not explicitly repudiate the “inside” or
“intermingled” meaning of “among” or explicitly adopt the
“between” meaning, it adopted doctrines that largely
accomplished this result.
After the Civil War, these narrow commerce doctrines
survived, though obviously no longer in the service of slavery,23
but instead in the service of an emerging “laissez-faire” outlook
on the Court, where they soon found perfect expression in two
recently invented terms: “interstate commerce” and “intrastate
commerce.”
D. INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE COMMERCE
1. Original Meaning and Use of “Interstate” Commerce
The neologism “interstate” was apparently invented in the
1840’s, but first appeared in a Supreme Court majority opinion
paired with the word “commerce” in 1869. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the first meaning of
“interstate” is: “(l)ying, extending, or carried on between
independent states, or between states belonging to a Union,
Federation, etc. Also as n., a road between states.”24 The OED’s
first source is none other than the eminent Justice Joseph Story,
who supposedly first used the term in his posthumous 1846

21. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS THE STATES: “BACK
TO THE CONSTITUTION” 141, 257 (Peter Smith, 1962) (1936). JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER, 70,
90–93 (1992). To be clear, Taney did not himself use the later invented term “dual
federalism.”
22. Of course, political divisions in the country also limited attempts of Congress to
extend federal power.
23. Though they quite importantly did continue to support Jim Crow laws. See infra
p. 135.
24. Interstate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
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Miscellaneous Writings.25 The OED’s source for Story as the first
user is Joseph E. Worcester’s 1860 Dictionary of the English
Language.26 However, Worcester simply says the source is Story
without providing what Story actually said, that the word is
composed of “inter” and “state,” derives from the field of law, and
means “existing between different states.”27 Without the actual
quotation from Story it is difficult to know precisely what he
meant by “interstate,” especially in the context of the power to
regulate commerce among the states. The OED’s second source
is J. M. Ludlow’s A Sketch of the History of the United States,
where he is quoted as saying “[t]he Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction in all questions of constitutional, international, and (if
I may venture the term) interstate law.”28 This does not give much
sense of how he understood the term relative to the between
versus among debate. The OED’s third source is George
Bancroft’s 1876 History of the United States of America.29
Bancroft’s use was not clearly in the narrow sense of relating only
to objects as they pass over a boundary between states: he
referred to the privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of
Confederation as granting “inter-state rights.”30 Clearly, the rights
in question were based on the idea that citizens could move from
state to state, but the rights obviously would also apply to a citizen
inside a state, and were thus not limited only to the instant when
citizens crossed state boundaries.
We have, however, found a use of the term “inter-state” as
early as 1841, in the arguments of counsel31 in the important
slavery case Groves v. Slaughter,32 which concerned primarily
whether Mississippi could ban the importation and sale of slaves
25. Despite diligent searching, however, the author has been unable to find the actual
use of this term in this volume, so it is not clear how Story might have used the term.
26. JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1860).
27. Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
28. OXFORD, supra note 24; J. M. LUDLOW, A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 36 (1862)
29. OXFORD, supra note 24; GEORGE BANCROFT, 6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 34 (1876).
30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, Art. IV, § 1; OXFORD, supra note 24, at
34–35. The hyphenated version of “interstate” seems to have disappeared from use in the
1890’s and generally we use the modern version. Lexis generally retrieves both versions.
However, searching in Word requires searching for each version separately. See infra pp.
439–41, 457, and notes 36 and 64.
31. As discussed infra p. 451, Lexis search results before the 1950’s often include
arguments of counsel.
32. 40 U.S. 449 (1841).
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from other states. The term “inter-state” was used five times by
Counsel Walker to refer to actual commerce in slaves between
Mississippi and other states, though importantly not as a synonym
for the federal power over commerce among the several states. In
addition, the phrase “commerce between the states” was used
throughout as a synonym for “inter-state,” reinforcing the
interchangeability of both terms. Use of both terms was
appropriate to the facts of the case since the issue was a state’s
ability to prevent movement of slaves across its border from a
neighboring state. This case is thus perhaps the earliest recorded
instance of the use of the term “interstate” as well as to use it in
the narrow “crossing a state border” meaning, though obviously
the term did not catch on right away. Justice Story was on the
Court and participated in Groves v. Slaughter, so perhaps that is
where he first heard the term, then used it in his book in 1846,
where it was noticed by Worcester.
An 1869 case, Hinson v. Lott,33 used “inter-state” once in the
published argument of counsel John A. Campbell.34 Hinson
concerned whether the City of Mobile, Alabama, in taxing sales,
auctions and other activities, violated the no state import or
export tax clause,35 because some of the goods the city taxed came
from other states. The case concerned relations between two
states, so that use of “inter-state” was again quite appropriate.36
The first actual use of the term “inter-state” in a majority
Supreme Court opinion was in Woodruff v. Parham, decided
November 8, 1869, the same day as Hinson. Justice Miller for the
majority argued that the no import or export duty clause only
applied to “foreign” imports and exports. He distinguished the
earlier case of Almy v. California, saying in that case
[t]he master of the ship Rattler was fined for violating this law,
by refusing to affix a stamp to a bill of lading for gold shipped
on board his vessel from San Francisco to New York. It seems
to have escaped the attention of counsel on both sides, and of

33. 75 U.S. 148 (1869).
34. Appointed to the Court in 1853, Campbell resigned in 1861 to join the
Confederacy, resuming the practice of law after the War. OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (KERMIT L. HALL ed., 1992), 116–17.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
36. Campbell is quoted as saying “the State act regulated inter-state commerce.”
Hinson, 75 U.S. at 150.
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the Chief Justice who delivered the opinion, that the case was
one of inter-state commerce.37

In this usage Miller seemed to apply “inter-state” to
commerce involving a ship that was clearly sailing from one state
to another, rather than from abroad, so that in this case the
“between” meaning of “inter-state” was quite appropriate, and
Miller’s use of “interstate” was not purporting to describe the
whole extent of the federal power. Campbell was a counsel in both
Hinson and Woodruff, so Campbell’s use of “inter-state” in
Hinson may have inspired the Court to use it in Woodruff. Miller
used the term only once, though the dissent used it six times.
After this first appearance in a majority opinion, the next two
majority opinions to use “interstate commerce” similarly used it
appropriately in the “between” sense corresponding to the actual
facts of the case, which involved actual navigation across state
lines, 38 or in-state water transport of goods intended for or from
market out of state.39 The latter case was a little less clear, since
the Court was actually describing “intercourse,” and found that
internal navigation that was part of a larger movement of the
goods across state lines was regulable, but called it “between.”
Thus the first few opinions did not use “interstate” in an allencompassing sense but seemingly as a lesser included term
within the broader meaning of “commerce among the several
states.”
After its introduction by the Court in 1869, the term
“interstate commerce” rapidly became a Court and general public
favorite, its initial use by the Court soon reinforced by the 1887
passage of the correspondingly called Interstate Commerce Act.40
Since then, as shown more fully below,41 “interstate” has displaced
by far the Framers’ phrase “among the states” in Supreme Court
usage, and in the legal academy as well, including, ironically, even
in discussions of the “original meaning” or “original
understanding” of the power to regulate commerce.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 137 (1869).
St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1870).
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1870).
See supra p. 430 and note 2.
See infra Part II.
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2. “Intrastate”
A few decades after the Court adopted “interstate
commerce” it adopted another neologism, “intrastate.”
“Intrastate” was often followed by “commerce” and paired with
but sharply contrasted with “interstate commerce” to emphasize
commerce or activity not normally subject to regulation under the
“interstate commerce” power but instead left with the state.42 The
OED’s definition of “intrastate” is “occurring within a class,
political party, state,”43 and first quotes Emory Johnson as using
the term in 1903 to refer to the Supreme Court’s important 1886
Wabash decision, where the Court urged Congress to regulate the
railroads.44 However, a search of the Wabash case did not find the
term, though the use of “intrastate” would have been highly
appropriate, so Johnson was likely characterizing the Court’s
words as in some fashion embodying the concept of “intrastate.”
The first actual usage of “intrastate” that we found by the Court
was in 1890 in another of the by then very numerous railroad
cases, Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Southern Pacific
Company.45 In a case involving whether the Louisiana Supreme
Court improperly overturned a contract dealing with interstate
railroad traffic, Chief Justice Fuller significantly characterized the
plaintiff’s argument by contrasting “interstate” with “intrastate”:
“that as the agreement related to earnings from interstate as well
as from intrastate traffic, such decision was an interference with
the freedom of interstate commerce . . . .”46 Clearly the two terms
were seen here as an all-inclusive set, “interstate” expressing on
the one hand that commerce which could be federally regulated,
and “intrastate” on the other that which could not be, at least by
itself, and generally that is how they have been used since.
Thus, this use of “intrastate” excludes the considerable
amount of activity inside a state that Marshall said could be
included within the meaning of “among the several states,” i.e.,
42. The “interstate-intrastate” distinction seems to be conceptually the same as the
“dual federalism” concept attributed to Taney, supra pp. 109–10, DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568–74, 694 (9th ed. 2014), though to be clear, Taney did not
actually use these terms.
43. Intrastate, OXFORD, supra note 24.
44. Wabash, St. Louis, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). Apparently,
this decision spurred Congress to pass what became known as the Interstate Commerce
Act the next year. See infra pp. 430, 453, and note 54; see supra note 2.
45. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 137 U.S. 48, 53 (1890).
46. Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
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internal activity that “affects more states than one,” and arguably
and crucially is not the distinction the Framers understood. To be
sure, the Framers unquestionably recognized that much would be
left to the states to regulate under the power to regulate
commerce among the several states, but they did not say that “the
much to be left to the states to regulate” would be “any and all
commerce inside a state,” and they arguably anticipated federal
regulation of commerce inside any number of states more than
one by clearly choosing to use “among the several” instead of
“between.”47
To be sure, the Court does not always pair “intrastate” with
“interstate commerce”, but “intrastate” has been used in most of
the major commerce cases since its introduction, and Table 2
shows that the two actually appear as a pair in majority opinions
more often than the original words of the Constitution. While
“interstate” by itself conveys the narrow “between” sense, joining
it frequently with “intrastate” solidifies the idea that “interstate
commerce” is limited to that which crosses a state line and
probably only at the moment of crossing, before becoming
“intrastate,” which is inside a state and therefore left to the states
to regulate. Thus the two terms together reinforce the dual
federalism approach from Taney onward, and imply that exercise
of the “interstate commerce power” inside a state can only be
done with the help of some kind of extending doctrines. The
problem is that arguably neither these terms nor the concepts they
embody reflect the original understanding or the actual meaning
of the language of the Constitution.
II. THE DATA
A. EXPLANATION OF TABLE 1
Table 1 presents our most important findings. Starting from
the left, Column 1 shows our various time periods. Moving
rightward are three columns all under the broader overall heading
of “2. ‘commerce among the several states.’” First, Column 2A
shows the total number of majority opinions for each time period
citing “commerce among the several states.” Then Column 2B
shows the total number of uses of that phrase within the majority
47. See supra pp. 434–37 and note 13; see infra pp. 443–45, 449, 451–52, 473–75, 477–
85, 489–491, 492–93, 497–98 and accompanying notes, and note 176.
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opinions counted in Column 2A. Finally, Column 2C shows the
ratio of uses of the search language per opinion-how many times
“commerce among the several states” was used on average per
majority opinion for that time period.
Further to the right, the pattern repeats for the overall
category “3. Interstate Commerce.” Under this in Column 3A,
paralleling Column 2A, are the number of majority opinions per
time period citing “interstate commerce” at least once. In Column
3B are the total number of uses of that phrase in the opinions that
used the phrase at least once, and in Column 3C is the ratio of
uses per opinion, paralleling Columns 2B and 2C.
At the far right, Column 4 is a ratio showing how many
majority opinions per time period used “interstate commerce”
divided by the number of opinions citing “commerce among the
several states,” which is Column 3A divided by Column 2A. In
other words, Column 4 shows how many majority opinions cited
“interstate commerce” compared to opinions citing “commerce
among the several states.” (There is some overlap because
opinions often quoted both). Column 5 does the same thing for
Columns 2B and 3B, comparing how many times “interstate
commerce” was used in majority opinions versus “commerce
among the several states.” At the bottom is a Totals row.
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Table 1. Total Number of Opinions and Uses of CommerceRelated Terms48

B. EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF TABLE 1
Table 1 shows the rapid rise and dominance of “interstate
commerce” over “commerce among the several states” after the
first use of the former term in 1869 by a Court majority. This rise
can be quickly seen from the Totals row at the bottom, showing
that overall, in the 141 years from 1869 till the end of 2009,
majority opinions citing “interstate commerce” have exceeded
the number of those citing “commerce among the several states”
by over three and a half to one. The difference in the actual
number of mentions of the terms in the majority opinions that used
48.

Some data before 1890 include “inter-state.” See supra note 30.
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either of these terms at least once was even more lopsided, over
eight and a half to one. In other words, since its introduction in
1869 the Court not only used “interstate commerce” in many
more majority opinions than it used “commerce among the
several states,” but it also used it much more often than the
language of the Constitution within those opinions.
In examining Table 1 more closely, we see first, that, as to
“commerce among the several states,” in Columns 2A, B and C,
this or some close variant was the only term used by the Court
majority before 1869, with the limited exception, discussed below,
of “between the several states.” After the introduction of
“interstate commerce” in 1869, the number of opinions citing
“commerce among the several states” gradually increased, but
never increased greatly, always remaining below 100 cases per
decade, and for all decades except the 1920s less than fifty
opinions per decade. The average number of uses of “commerce
among the states” per Court opinion was actually higher before
the introduction of “interstate commerce,” about 4.48 uses per
opinion up to 1869, with the bulk of these uses being in Gibbons
and a few other cases. After that, the rate of use decreased slightly
for a few decades, and after the 1910s began to decrease much
more to less than two uses per case, and since the 1990’s, to little
more than one use per case on average.
In contrast, by 1890 “interstate commerce,” far and away
dominated the Court’s discussion of the power over commerce.
This is shown several ways: first, Columns 3A, B and C show that
after 1869 “interstate commerce” rapidly rose in use, with the
highest number of opinions citing the term in the 1910s, and then
the number gradually tapering off thereafter. But in every decade
since the 1890’s, the number of opinions mentioning “interstate
commerce” exceeded those mentioning “commerce among the
several states,” and after the 1890’s they always exceeded the
latter by twice, and often more. In the crucial decade of the 1930s,
majority opinions citing “interstate commerce” exceeded those
citing the language of the Constitution by over eleven to one.
Even in the 2000s, “interstate commerce” cases exceeded
“commerce among the states” cases by over three to one.
If we count the total number of uses of “interstate
commerce” in opinions citing it compared to the total number of
uses of “commerce among the states,” the dominance of the
former is even more pronounced. Since the 1910s, the ratio of

4 - WEILER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

7/11/19 6:28 PM

“AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES”

347

dominance has always been at least just under ten to one,
ironically peaking in the crucial decade of the 1930s, as shown in
the far right column, when the number of uses of the term
“interstate commerce” was almost forty-five times the number of
uses citing the actual language of the Constitution. Since then the
difference has decreased, but always remained at nearly ten-toone or more. These data show that, to the extent that it is invoked
at all, the actual language of the Constitution is in a long decline
if not actually on a path to extinction, invoked probably largely
for symbolism, and long ago ceasing to be the working language
of the Court.
Some of the data from Table 1 are represented graphically in
Chart 1 below.
Chart 1. Commerce Among the States v. Interstate Commerce:
Cases Mentioning Terms and Number of Mentions of Terms by
Time Periods
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C. EXPLANATION AND DISCUSSION OF TABLE 2
Table 2. Majority Opinions Joining “Interstate Commerce” and
“Intrastate”
Period

1789-1869
1870-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899
1900-1909
1910-1919
1920-1929
1930-1939
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009
Totals

Term
A. Commerce B. Interstate
Among
Commerce
The States
21
1
31
27
47
44
57
115
59
143
98
412
45
270
22
256
55
258
39
155
32
126
30
129
47
146
30
84
15
48
628
2211

Ratios
C. Col. B. and 4. Column B as %
Intrastate
of Column A
0
0
0
6
26
152
119
127
104
49
43
41
41
21
19
748

5
87
94
202
242
419
600
1164
469
397
394
430
311
280
320
119

Table 2 lists the same time periods as in Table 1 above, and
Column A repeats the same data as Table 1 regarding the
occurrence of the actual language of the Constitution in majority
opinions. Column B shows the number of opinions per decade
quoting “interstate commerce” and “intrastate” at least once in
the same opinion. Column C shows Column B as a percentage of
Column A, or the frequency in which the Court used “interstate
commerce” in the same opinion along with “intrastate,”
compared to the frequency that it used the actual constitutional
language.
As Column C shows, since its first use combined with
“interstate commerce” in a Supreme Court majority opinion in
1890,49 “intrastate” has often been used by the Court to
complement “interstate commerce,” and like “interstate
commerce” its use also rose dramatically after introduction,
49.

See supra p. 442 and note 46.
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though not to the same level. From 1910 to 1979, however,
“intrastate” was used with “interstate commerce” in more
opinions than the actual words of the Constitution in Column A,
and again in the most recent decade.
D. “BETWEEN THE STATES”
The expressions “between the states” or “between the
several states” were also used by the Court from the beginning,
before and after the introduction of “interstate commerce,” but
not nearly as often as “among the several states.” The importance
of “between the states” is that it was and still is for some an
expression of an early narrow meaning of the constitutional
language, essentially having the same meaning as the later
“interstate,” in contrast to the broader “among” meaning
discussed above.50 Recognizing this, Table 3 shows search results
for “commerce between the several states,” or close variations, in
majority opinions. Because there were relatively few instances of
the Court using “commerce between the states” we put the data
into only three time periods.
Table 3. Court Opinions Using “Commerce Between the States”

Period

“Commerce Between the States”

1789-1869

16

1870-1929

167

1930-2009

48

Total

231
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The data in this study resulted from an analysis of how
frequently certain terms appeared in majority opinions of the
United States Supreme Court when searched in LexisNexis

50.

See supra note 47.
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(hereinafter Lexis).51 In the interest of space, I will only
summarize key methodological steps, but further information is
available from the author. The main methodological issues were
what search terms to use, what data sets to search, and how to
classify the data chronologically. The actual process of deciding
on each of the methodological steps was very pragmatic and
interactive, with many different combinations being laboriously
tried before deciding on a particular method.
A. SEARCH TERMS
1. “commerce among the several states”
The most difficult part of defining the research methodology
was selecting the appropriate search terms and ensuring their
validity. The commerce clause is written in the Constitution by
first granting Congress a power to regulate commerce, then
directing it toward foreign nations, then to “commerce . . . among
the several states,” and finally to the Indian tribes. In order to
ensure that these searches were finding “among the several
states” in the context of commerce and not something possibly
unrelated, we had to find a way to allow for the Court possibly
quoting the power over foreign or Indian commerce as well as the
commerce we were looking for. After considerable
experimentation I found that over the centuries the Court has
employed a variety of phrasings closely related to the actual
language of the Constitution when discussing the power over
commerce among the several states. Sometimes the Court literally
quoted the entire commerce power of Article I, § 8, but more
often the court left out “with foreign nations” or “and with the
Indian tribes.” Sometimes the Court said something like “the
power to regulate that commerce which is among the several
states.” Perhaps most frequently the Court paraphrased or quoted
the constitutional language closely except for omitting the
“several” from “among the several states.” All of these
expressions, it seemed, were very close to the original language.
To accommodate these various phrasings, I decided to use
the search terms “commerce (with up to five words intervening)
51. BARBARA LEIGH SMITH ET AL, P OLITICAL RESEARCH METHODS 204–25
(1976); JOSEPH A. MAXWELL, Designing a Qualitative Study, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED
SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 69–100 (LEONARD BICKMAN AND DEBRA ROG, eds.,
1998).
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among (up to three words intervening) states,” which
accommodated all the above variations. I eliminated attempts to
capture “to regulate” or variants because their presence or
absence did not affect our purpose. Searching with five words
intervening between “commerce” and “among” allowed for the
inclusion of the three word phrase “with foreign nations”
following “commerce,” or the four word phrase “with foreign
nations and” which sometimes was used after “commerce” and
before “among,” and did not seem to include any undesirable
phrases. Searching with three words between “among” and
“states” allowed for the phrase “the several” to be included, when
the Court was quoting the actual language of the Constitution,
and did not seem to include any inappropriate results. The actual
Lexis search term was (“commerce w/5 among w/3 states”).
2. “Interstate Commerce”
“Interstate commerce,” was very easy to search for, because
it had no variations within the phrase, so our search phrase was
(interstate commerce).
3. “Intrastate”
The search for “intrastate” when combined with “interstate”
was also straightforward. The search term was (“interstate” AND
“intrastate”).
4. “Commerce Between the Several States”
The problems searching for this phrase were the same as
those for “commerce among the several states” so we used
essentially the same search term: (commerce w/5 between w/3
states).
B. THE SEARCH UNIVERSE: SUPREME COURT MAJORITY
OPINIONS
The goal of this study was always to focus on the Court’s
actual words, but surprisingly it took a fair amount of
experimentation to decide how best to do that. Unless they are
limited, Lexis searches return such things as headnotes, syllabus,
summaries, and often, until around the 1950’s, very lengthy
arguments of counsel, in addition to majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions. In addition to greatly increasing the number
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of search results, surprisingly headnotes, syllabi, and summaries
often retroactively inserted “interstate commerce” or
“intrastate,” even where the Court itself may not have used those
terms, and sometimes did not use the actual language of the
Constitution even where the Court did. Searching full or partial
arguments of counsel would also have added greatly to the
number of results and the potential complexity of analysis. I
considered including concurring and dissenting opinions, but
decided to exclude these also, since, while often quite important,
they were technically not the binding opinion of the Court, and
would add significantly to the complexity and amount of the data
analysis, especially after it became apparent that just selecting
majority opinions would itself produce a large amount of data. So
I did advanced searches for all cases since 1789, but in majority
opinions only.
Thus, the universe and the sample for this study are the sameall Supreme Court majority opinions since 1789, so there is no
sampling problem.
C. TIME PERIODS
Experimentation also led to deciding to arrange our main
results by decade, except for an initial period from 1789 to 1869.
This lengthy initial period was picked both because there were
relatively few regulation of commerce among the several states
cases before the Civil War, as well as because the term “interstate
commerce” was not used by the Supreme Court majority before
1869. Shortly after this period, however, the pace of Commerce
Clause cases picked up dramatically, and at the same time the
Court began to heavily favor the term “interstate,” so from 1870
on we decided to present data in Tables 1 and 2 by decades.52 This
use of decades also gave a rough match over time to changing
public events and changing Court doctrines, although more
refined analysis would obviously be appropriate in a future study,
such as of “natural courts,”53 or individual justices. However,
using natural courts would produce several dozens of time
periods, all of unequal length, sometimes covering only a few
months. Analyzing by individual Chief Justices, or even by
individual Justices would doubtless also be useful, but given that
52.
53.

Table 3 has longer time periods as explained supra p. 449.
“Natural courts” are periods in which the same justices are on the Court.
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the purposes of this study were to simply point out that “interstate
commerce” has largely replaced “commerce . . . among the states”
on the Court, and to inquire into the possible significance of this
development, it seemed sufficient to categorize by decades, which
gives a rough measure of the relative use of the main search terms
on a consistent and comparable chronological basis. Other
possible bases of classification would be the amount of legislation
passed by Congress under the power over commerce, the kind of
commerce issue involved,54 or eras in the Court’s doctrines
regarding the power to regulate commerce. However, analysis of
factors such as these would greatly complicate analysis and
comparability well beyond our purposes and resources in this
initial study. Finally, as a practical matter, Lexis searches are
limited to 1000 results, and by trial and error it appeared that
breaking the analysis down by decades for majority opinions only
would keep from having over 1000 cases in any decade, while still
not having a large number of time periods to compare.
D. VALIDITY OF SEARCH TERMS
The biggest validity problems-making sure the results
reflected what I really was looking for-arose from search results
where the Court might have been necessarily quoting party
names, statutory language, or perhaps its own earlier language,
though in quoting itself there was arguably more of an element of
the Court’s own choice. There was no way to simply eliminate this
problem, with one huge exception. By far the biggest problem of
invalid results arose with “interstate commerce” searches,
stemming from the fact that the term “Interstate Commerce
Commission” (ICC) and related terms such as “the interstate
commerce law,” “the interstate commerce act,” “the committee
on interstate commerce,” or “interstate commerce committee”
began to occur with great frequency within a few years after the
ICC was established in 1887,55 because the Commission itself was
frequently a party before the Court for decades in hundreds of
cases. Since none of these mentions of “interstate commerce”
where the ICC was a party, or references to the law that created
it could be considered voluntary expressions by the Court of its
language preferences, I decided to exclude them by searching
within the overall results and subtracting these terms from our
54.
55.

See supra p. 431 and note 4.
See, e.g., infra p. 457 and note 65.
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totals. This additional and laborious effort significantly reduced
the number of cases as well as uses within cases mentioning
“interstate commerce,” but obviously a great many still remained.
For all search terms, our results include a number of
instances of the Court quoting its own earlier opinions or statutes
other than the ICC where it might be argued the Court had no
choice in the use of one search term or the other. From much
examination of the search results, it appears that these instances
are relatively proportional between the two search terms, and are
nowhere near a majority of the results. The data, combined with
a detailed examination of numerous opinions, show beyond any
doubt that the Court has long used “interstate commerce” as its
term of choice for applying what the Constitution states as the
power to “regulate commerce among the several states,” even
though I did not separate out instances of the Court citing the
search terms in non-ICC related statutory language or its own
opinions.
Searches for either “commerce among the several states” or
the “between” variant could possibly have produced some cases
that were actually about foreign commerce if the Court had cited
or paraphrased the full commerce power, but inspection of the
results showed that this was highly unlikely, largely because there
were relatively few such cases, and also because the court usually
limited itself to only mentioning the power over foreign
commerce when that was the power in question. Regarding
“commerce between the several states,” there were a few validity
problems where a treaty of amity and commerce was involved,
and the Court was referring to commerce between the states and
foreign countries, or sometimes even when the Court was
referring to actual relations between two states, and not as a
synonym for “commerce among the several states,” so I
individually excluded these instances.
Regarding “intrastate,” when used by itself it could be
completely unrelated to our concern with the commerce power,
so I was careful to search for it only in combination with
“interstate commerce.” Also, unlike the data in Table 1, I did not
eliminate instances in Table 2 where the sole mention of
“interstate” resulted from a reference to the ICC. Thus, the
number of opinions cited in Table 2 includes a few cases that
would not have been included in Table 1 because their only
reference to “interstate commerce” appearing jointly with
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“intrastate” was where the former referred to the ICC. However,
the additional number of such cases appears to be relatively small,
and in any case, “intrastate” did not appear in the legislation
creating the ICC, so its use was still voluntary by the Court even
in such cases, and obviously the term was utilized and understood
as complementary to and exclusive of “interstate commerce”
whether or not the latter term was required by legislation. Finally,
despite care in searching, there is a very small chance that even
when used in the same opinion with “interstate commerce,”
occurrences of “intrastate” might not refer to activities relevant
to our purposes.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. “INTERSTATE COMMERCE” BECOMES THE WHOLE
MEANING OF “COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES.”
After the Civil War the commerce-narrowing doctrines
established by Taney were obviously no longer needed to protect
slavery. However, for the most part they did not disappear but
were refashioned during the so-called “laissez-faire” or Lochner
era, where a goal of the Court was to keep most federal and state
regulation of the now rapidly growing national and international
economy within fairly strict limits, and particularly to keep
regulation of “production”—especially regulations of labor and
manufacturing-out of federal and sometimes even state control.
A key part of the effort to keep the federal power over
commerce among the states narrow seems to have been changing
the name of the power. Once adopted by the Court, and especially
when contrasted with “intrastate,” the term “interstate
commerce” seemed to exactly express the Court’s thinking and
rapidly became the primary language for the Court to express and
limit the power to regulate commerce among the states as the
cases involving that power multiplied in response to the growing
economy. Above it was shown how at first the Court seemed to
actually apply “interstate commerce” to what was truly only
“between” states. Quite rapidly, however, a synechdoche was
created, and the part became the whole: “interstate commerce”
became not just a gloss but the power to regulate commerce
among the several states itself. For example, Justice Swayne
writing in 1876 said “[t]he commerce clauses of the Constitution
had their origin in a wise and salutary policy. They give to
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Congress the entire control of the foreign and inter-state
commerce of the country.”56
Clearly, “interstate commerce” had become “the commerce
clause” for Justice Swayne as early as 1876. Similarly, in the
otherwise thoroughly obscure 1898 case of Vance v. Vandercook
Justice White noted-without examining its significance-the
already achieved dominance of the term “interstate commerce”:
“the statute was repugnant to the third clause of section 8 of the
first article of the [C]onstitution of the United States, commonly
spoken of as the ‘[I]nterstate [C]ommerce clause’ of the
[C]onstitution.”57 An equivalence between “between” and
“interstate” and a reading of “between” and “interstate” into the
Framers’ purposes in drafting the Constitution was also expressed
in 1893 by Justice Brewer:
Commerce between the States is a matter of national
regulation, and to establish it as such was one of the principal
causes which led to the adoption of our [C]onstitution. To-day,
the volume of interstate commerce far exceeds the anticipation
of those who framed this [C]onstitution, and the main channels
through which this interstate commerce passes are the
railroads of the country.58

Thus, in addition to its quantitative dominance shown above,
more importantly, the term “interstate commerce” seems
certainly by the end of the 19th century to have become accepted
qualitatively as equivalent to the “between” meaning of “among
the several states,” in contrast to the “inside” meaning, and to
express the Court’s conception of the power granted by the
Framers as not normally reaching inside states. Unlike most
doctrine, if such it was, however, the transition in terminology and
whatever it was intended to mean was not announced nor even
examined but instead simply occurred, apparently without anyone
objecting or even noticing.
A further elaboration on the “interstate-intrastate”
dichotomy came in 1895 in the important case United States v. E.
C. Knight Co.,59 which dealt with whether the newly passed
Sherman Antitrust Act60 would apply to a monopoly of the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 245 (1876) (emphasis added).
Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Company, 170 US 438, 442 (1898) (emphasis added).
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893) (emphasis added).
156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1).
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production of refined sugar. Even though the Act itself utilized
only the language “commerce among the several states” in
defining the basis for banning formation of monopolies, and never
used “interstate commerce,” Chief Justice Fuller repeatedly
translated the former into the latter.61 Though the Court did not
actually pair “interstate commerce” with “intrastate,” it ruled that
the power over “interstate commerce” could not reach
production, because production was by definition “local,” and not
commerce, and thereby left entirely to the states to regulate in
order to preserve our “dual form of government.”62 Furthermore,
the Court ruled that even if production, in this case refining of
sugar, was clearly done for the purpose of out-of-state sale, and
clearly affected “interstate commerce,” nonetheless production
only “indirectly” affected interstate commerce, not “directly,”
and thus could not be federally regulated, presumably even with
the “affecting commerce” doctrine. To be sure, here the Court
was primarily focusing on defining the term “commerce” so as to
exclude “production,” but there is a strong overlap between
“intrastate” activity being outside federal control and production
being considered as “local” or “intrastate” by definition.63
The narrow meaning of the regulation of commerce as
limited to regulation of movement across state lines was also the
meaning conveyed in the landmark act of 1887 creating the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The actual title of the act was
“An Act to Regulate Commerce,” and the only reference in the
Act to “inter-state” was in the section creating the Interstate
Commerce Commission, but the Act immediately became
universally known as the “Interstate Commerce Act,” its title a
tribute to the rising popularity of “interstate commerce.”64 As
noted by an early railroad law expert, this Act was perceived to
61. The relevant language of § 1 of the Act was: “Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” § 2 of the act
repeated the “among the several states” language. The act was entitled “An act to protect
trade and commerce” . . .” However, the statute somewhat ambiguously referred to goods
moving from one state to another, as if that were the meaning of the constitutional
language. Id. The Court’s opinion used “among the several states” five times, and
“interstate commerce,” “trade,” or “market” 13 times. Knight, 156 U.S. at 9–17.
62. Knight, 156 U.S. at 15.
63. Infra pp. 458, 463, 473, 484–85, and notes 176 and 178.
64. The term “interstate commerce” appeared in the act itself exactly once, in § 11,
creating the “Inter-State Commerce Commission.” Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104,
PUB. L. 49-41 (1887), abolished 109 Stat. 803, PUB. L. 104-88 (1995).
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express
the
“interstate-intrastate”
distinction,
clearly
distinguishing between permissible federal control over railroad
traffic crossing state lines and intrastate traffic beyond federal
control.65 But while the “interstate-intrastate” distinction may
have been conceptually appealing, as a practical matter the
difficulty of separating “interstate” from “intrastate” railway
traffic in many situations led to a series of arcane and tortured
decisions over the next several decades in which the Court
repeatedly tried to decide under what circumstances many highly
specific aspects of integrated railroad operations, such as
passengers, freight, railway cars and engines, railway workers, and
particular operations of the railroads were to be legally classed
either as “interstate” or as “intrastate,” while still allowing some
degree of effective overall regulation.66 Eventually the
impracticality of the linguistic straitjacket of the interstateintrastate distinction that both the Court and Congress had
created for themselves regarding railroad regulation and other
matters led, as discussed next, to the Court finding a variety of
ways to extend the reach of “the interstate commerce power”
inside states. Arguably they could have done the same thing
simply by construing “among the several states” to reach inside
more than one state by definition.
B. INTERSTATE COMMERCE REACHES INTRASTATE
One of the first decisions to breach the linguistic confines of
the “interstate-intrastate commerce” dichotomy came in 1911
when the Court upheld seizing impure eggs inside a state under
the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 as an exercise of the
“interstate commerce power” and the necessary and proper
clause. As Justice McKenna stated, “[t]he question in the case,
therefore is, What power has Congress over such articles? Can
they escape the consequences of their illegal transportation by

65. EMORY R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION, 361 (1903).
66. Congress also eventually modified the law to fit reality. James W. Ely, Jr., “The
railroad system has burst through State limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce,18301920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 968–69 (2003). Ironically, the title of this article itself expressed
the problem of the need to “burst through” and reach inside states despite characterizing
federal power as limited to “interstate commerce.” The author recognized this problem
when he concluded that “the railroad experience . . . suggests that there is an air of
unreality about drawing precise lines between interstate and intrastate commerce.” Id. at
979. We agree entirely but argue that the “unreality” stems from the ersatz language on
which the Court relied instead of the actual constitutional language.
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being mingled at the place of destination with other property?”67
The defendant had argued that after crossing the state line “the
eggs had passed into the general mass of property in the State and
out of the field covered by interstate commerce” and were hence
beyond the reach of “the interstate commerce power.”68 Thus, the
argument seemed clearly cast in terms of whether the eggs were
in the process of crossing a state boundary (i.e., “interstate”), and
were thus within “the rule which marks the line between the
exercise of Federal power and state power over articles of
legitimate commerce,” (i.e., intrastate,) or could somehow still be
reached even though clearly inside a state. In upholding the
federal law, the Court remained entirely within the “interstate”
framework, but accepted the need to regulate the adulterated
eggs that had passed out of “interstate commerce” and gone
inside the state by using the necessary and proper clause in order
to uphold the “goal” of the statute. 69 But in referring to eggs that
had “mingled with” other property, Justice McKenna seemed
unaware of the fact discussed above70 that the actual power in the
Constitution, “among the several states” arguably already meant
“mingled with,” and thus whether they had previously crossed a
state line or not, in-state eggs mingled with “interstate eggs” could
arguably be regulated by definition as a “legitimate goal” in
themselves under the power to regulate commerce among the
several states without need of assistance from the necessary and
proper clause at all.
Another important early workaround on the limits of the
interstate-intrastate commerce dichotomy came in the 1905 case
Swift & Company v. United States.71 Swift concerned the
application of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act to Swift and other
Midwest meatpackers controlling about 60% of the national
market and accused of conspiring to fix prices, manipulate the
market for cattle, arrange artificially low railroad rates, and other
monopolistic actions. Counsel for Swift and the others argued that
what they were doing was not “interstate trade or commerce”
because the sales of fresh meat “were made at the places where
the meats [were] prepared” by the buyers’ agents at the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911) (emphasis added).
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
Id.
Supra pp. 435–36.
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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slaughterhouses and were therefore “domestic sales,” that the
delivery of the meat to the railroads was itself not any part of
“interstate transportation,” and that the sales to agents of buyers
from other states were also “not incidents of interstate
commerce,” presumably because the actual act of sale occurred
inside a state. Thus, Swift’s counsel were implicitly invoking the
“interstate-intrastate” dichotomy and arguing for a very narrow,
border-crossing definition of “commerce among the several
states” with no look to the broader context and movement of the
activities and goods in question. Swift also argued that any effect,
if any, of their meat-packing on interstate commerce, was only
indirect, invoking the Knight doctrine that production only
indirectly affected commerce,72 and that any ultimate purpose or
fact of the sales of the cattle or meat to go into broader commerce
in other states did not matter despite their 60% control. The
government countered that there was a broader effect on
commerce deriving from the companies’ overall pattern of
activity, and though the government’s attorneys argued
exclusively within the language of “interstate commerce,” they
tied it to a broad Marshallian meaning taken literally from
Gibbons, defining it repeatedly and literally to mean “that
commerce which affects more states than one.”73
Holmes’ unanimous opinion in Swift upheld federal
regulation of sales of cattle in stockyards even though the activity
might not be in the “original package,” i.e., the cow had been cut
up into packages of meat, and even though the individual sales in
question might not be made while directly crossing a state
boundary, because all the transactions formed “a current of
commerce” Holmes generally agreed with the government and
while he did not refer directly to Gibbons, he did follow the broad
interpretation of Gibbons, and his “current of commerce” image
corresponded closely to Marshall’s (and Dr. Johnson’s) primary
72. Supra pp. 456–57.
73. For Swift’s argument, see Swift & Co. v. United States, 1905 LEXIS U.S. 908, 2–
17. The government anachronistically argued, for example “[a]s to what is interstate
commerce, see Gibbons v. Ogden” . . . .” But it broadly interpreted “interstate commerce”
by drawing on Gibbons: “[i]f interstate commerce is commerce which concerns more States
than one, and if a combination of independent producers to suppress competition between
its members is a restraint upon commerce, it must follow that a combination of
independent producers to fix and control prices and suppress competition between each
other in an area covering more States than one is in restraint of interstate commerce” . . . .”
Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added). As noted above, the act itself did not contain the language
“interstate commerce.” See supra p. 457 and note 61.
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definition of commerce as “intercourse,”74 as well as to Marshall’s
definition of commerce among the states as that commerce which
“concerns more states than one.” Though perfunctorily citing
Knight, Holmes completely bypassed Knight’s direct-indirect
distinction, saying commerce is a “practical” matter, and any
artificial or formalistic approach in this area (presumably as in
Knight) was especially likely to be inadequate. Holmes also
referred to Swift’s “current of commerce” as having a “unity,”
evoking Marshall’s comment in Gibbons, that “commerce is a
unit.”75
Holmes’ opinion interestingly never used the term
“interstate commerce,” and instead employed the original
constitutional language.76 However, despite the fact that the
Sherman Act also did not use “interstate commerce,” everyone
else involved in the case heavily utilized “interstate commerce,”
including both counsel, as already mentioned, and also the
headnote and syllabus writers, who helpfully and
anachronistically modernized Holmes’ careful use of the actual
constitutional language into “interstate commerce.” This contrast
between Holmes’ adherence to the actual language of the
Constitution77 and everyone else’s use of neologisms not only is a
tribute to the latter’s dominance, but also strengthens the idea
that the Court and other actors in the constitutional interpretation
process were not forced to employ “interstate commerce” by the
language of legislation, or anything else, but instead chose on their
own to use the recently invented term.
A third early and important tear in the Court’s self-created
linguistic straitjacket of the interstate-intrastate distinction came
74. Supra note 13.
75. Swift, 196 U.S. at 194. Holmes also did not seem to rely on the necessary and
proper clause.
76. See supra pp. 455–56 and note 61.
77. Holmes’ dissent in the earlier N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904),
which also tested the Sherman Act, similarly used only the actual language of the
Constitution, or the “between” variant, while everyone else heavily used “interstate
commerce.” However, most commentators assume Holmes in both cases and the Sherman
Act said or should be understood to have meant “interstate commerce:” for example,
regarding Holmes’ opinion in Swift, Richard A. Epstein wrote: “Justice Holmes came out
of his dissent in Northern Securities and wrote for a unanimous Court condemning this
cartel for its effect on interstate commerce”[.]” Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of
the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1439 (1987) (emphasis added). So if Holmes
avoided using the term “interstate commerce,” did he nonetheless mean it? Or was his
careful use of language sending some other message? See also supra pp. 455–56 and infra
note 149.
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in The Shreveport Rate Cases in 1914. Similarly to what it had done
in Hipolite Egg and Swift, here the Court announced another
doctrine whereby federal control could reach inside states to
regulate railroads. In his majority opinion Justice Hughes applied
the “interstate-intrastate” distinction, writing that congressional
authority over interstate carriers “necessarily embraces the right
to control their operations in all such matters having such a close
and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is
essential or appropriate,” and
[t]he fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce,
as well as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the
complete and paramount authority of Congress over the latter,
or preclude the Federal power from being exerted to prevent
the intrastate operations of such carriers from being made a
means of injury to that which has been confided to Federal
care.78

So, while intrastate railroad operations were off-limits to
federal regulation in principle, they could be regulated if they had
“a close and substantial relation to” interstate operations.
Ironically, in the process of making another exception to the
Court’s self-created interstate-intrastate dichotomy in Shreveport,
the Court again used a form of “mingle”: “[a]s Congress could
limit the hours of labor of those engaged in interstate
transportation, it necessarily followed that its will could not be
frustrated by . . . the commingling of duties relating to interstate
and intrastate operations.”79 In other words, the fact that railroad
activity might be “intrastate” would not bar federal regulation (as
it had arguably in Knight and other cases) if that activity was
commingled with “interstate” activity. But “mingled with” was
Dr. Johnson’s definition of “among,” and essentially Marshall’s
definition of “among” in Gibbons,80 so, like the Hipolite Egg
Court, the Shreveport Court could arguably just as easily have
used the original constitutional language without having to invent
the “close and substantial relation” test at all to overcome the
artificially narrow limits of the Court’s own interstate-intrastate
dichotomy.

78. Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (emphasis
added).
79. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
80. See supra pp. 435–46.
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But while the ICC may have broken through the interstateintrastate barrier regarding most aspects of regulation of the
railroads following Shreveport, it long allowed racial segregation
of “interstate” passengers in transportation until finally banning
it in 1955. However, in many Southern states, the main and easily
foreseeable effect of this ban on “interstate” transportation was
to activate the trusty interstate-intrastate distinction, so that
suddenly signs appeared literally designating separate waiting
rooms for white or colored “intrastate passengers,” often
adjoining theoretically integrated “interstate passenger” waiting
rooms, causing great confusion and largely undermining the ICC
decision. This application of the interstate-intrastate distinction
not only resonated directly with Taney’s earlier dual federalism
pro-slavery decisions, but exemplified again the real bite as well
as the unworkability of that distinction, demonstrating why, to be
effective, federal power over commerce must often reach inside
states according to its “among” meaning without reliance on
commerce extending doctrines. Racial integration of intrastate
bus waiting rooms as well as of many informally segregated
interstate ones only came about officially in 1961 with another
ICC decision, in large part as a result of pressure from the
Freedom Rides.81
C. THE NEW DEAL ERA
Hipolite Egg, Swift and Shreveport showed that extending the
reach of the “interstate commerce power” inside states to uphold
national legislation in the Progressive Era could be done by
applying various extending doctrines, but these doctrines were
narrow in application. A generation later, in 1937, after initial
resistance by the Court to New Deal programs, the Court
eventually extended these corollary doctrines quite broadly. But
in so doing, despite what is often called a “constitutional
revolution,” the Court still remained within the language of
“interstate commerce” and still relied on the necessary and
proper clause.
In the landmark 1937 Jones & Laughlin v. NLRB case, the
Court ended years of conflict with the New Deal, greatly widening

81. CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF
SOUTHERN TRANSIT, 99–107, 157–79 (1983).
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the breach in the barrier between inter- and intrastate activities it
had already made in the earlier cases above. The Court held that
[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
that control.82

Significantly, at the outset of his Jones & Laughlin opinion,
Chief Justice Hughes described in great detail the flow of activity
from mining iron ore to shipping it across the Great Lakes to
refining it into steel and fabricating it into finished goods and
further transporting it for sale in retail stores in other states. This
description not only evoked Holmes’ “current of commerce”
metaphor from Swift, but also exemplified “intercourse,” Dr.
Johnson’s and Marshall’s definition of “commerce,” as well as
Marshall’s characterization of commerce as a “unit”—a continual
set of interactions comprising an identifiable whole that has
commercial sense and coherence, indifferent to state boundaries,
if affecting more states than one.83 The fact of a large and
vertically integrated enterprise crossing state and national
borders also evoked the “mingled with” or “concerns more states
than one” meaning of “among the several states.”84 Yet despite all
these implicit references to the arguably broad original meaning
of the power to regulate commerce among the several states as
expressed in Gibbons, the Court performed even this historic turn
while remaining within the linguistic constraints of “interstate”
and “intrastate commerce,” extending the reach of the former
into the latter through the necessary and proper clause.85
To be sure, if Congress really only had power over “interstate
commerce,” it was (and is) probably correct that most intrastate
activities can only be regulated by the necessary and proper clause
extending inside states from state borders. But, again, the
question we pose is not how far can the “interstate commerce
power” reach inside states assisted by the necessary and proper

82. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (emphasis added).
83. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824).
84. Id. at 194.
85. Hughes suggested that the “close and substantial effects” test relied on this clause
of Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 by using “necessary,” as well as “appropriate” from McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420–21 (1819). Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
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clause, but how far the can the power “To regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States” reach inside states of its own force
unassisted by the necessary and proper clause. So, from our point
of view, all the Jones & Laughlin Court did was to take the power
over commerce back to its original meaning through an artificial,
circuitous, and unnecessarily complex linguistic and constitutional
path.
In any event, the real breakthrough of Jones & Laughlin was
in concluding broadly that separate, individual and “local”
instances of intrastate productive activities could be regulated if
they created a burden or substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Not only did this formulation effectively overturn the
direct-indirect distinction of Knight and its ban on regulating
production generally, but it also laid the groundwork for the
Wickard “aggregation” test of 1942, discussed more fully below.
After Jones & Laughlin the Court continued to expand the
reach of the “interstate commerce” power by using doctrines
which still ultimately relied on the necessary and proper clause,
but were also often linguistically confused. The next year, in
upholding the Wagner Act against a strike-breaking company,
Chief Justice Hughes explained how that which could or could not
be regulated under the power to regulate “interstate commerce”
could not be precisely calculated like a “mathematical formula,”
implicitly referring to Knight’s direct-indirect test. Hughes
confusingly said,
where federal control is sought to be exercised over activities
which separately considered are intrastate, it must appear that
there is a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
in order to justify the federal intervention for its protection.
...
But such [mathematical] formulas are not provided by the great
concepts of the Constitution such as “interstate commerce,”
“due process,” “equal protection.”86

Clearly Hughes felt that a term—“interstate commerce”—
neither in the Constitution nor invented till decades after its
ratification, was not only a “great concept” of the Constitution,
embodying the meaning of “commerce among the several states,”

86. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 466–68 (1938) (emphasis
added).
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but was also on the same level as the actual language of the
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. True, by
saying the “great concepts” of the Constitution such as “interstate
commerce” do not provide “mathematical formulas” like the
“direct-indirect” dichotomy, he was apparently agreeing with
Marshall that the power over commerce among the several states
should not be defined by a “mathematical line.”87 But he totally
overlooked the fact that the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy is
fully as or more mathematically precise as, if not also substantially
identical to, the “direct-indirect” dichotomy he had just rejected,88
and that its mathematical precision similarly caused, as in earlier
cases, a regulatory impracticality which could only be escaped
through the help of the necessary and proper clause. While he
avoided the “flow” analogy in this case, Hughes overlooked the
inherent conflict between the “great concept” of “interstate
commerce” limited to crossing state boundaries and the actual
intercourse inside states he had described the year before in Jones
and Laughlin.89
A few years later, in United States v Darby,90 a very important
1941 New Deal case upholding the wages and hours provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Chief Justice Stone tried to
reconcile the actual language of the Constitution with “interstate
commerce” and its extensions, but instead only tied himself in
linguistic knots:
[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as
to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .91

Stone’s first sentence is certainly ambiguous (as well as
anachronistic.) It literally seems to state that the power over
87. Supra p. 435.
88. Supra pp. 454, 458, and infra p. 489.
89. See discussion supra p. 465. Santa Cruz, 303 U.S. at 464–68.
90. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Interestingly, Darby applied the “interstate doctrine” to
overrule and broaden Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the opinion and holding
in which arguably limited the regulation of the already limited concept of interstate
commerce to even less than interstate commerce.
91. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118–19 (emphasis added).
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interstate commerce goes beyond the power granted in the actual
English words of the Constitution. However, since that reading is
implausible, on more careful reading Stone probably meant that
the two terms were identical, and the “is not confined” language
was setting the stage for his second sentence. This says that the
power over “interstate commerce” extends to intrastate activities
which sufficiently affect interstate commerce or Congress’s power
over it, via the necessary and proper clause, which he invokes by
citing and paraphrasing McCulloch, the case which of course
famously explicated the necessary and proper clause. Thus,
depending on the meaning of his first sentence, it would seem that
Stone assumed that the power to regulate “commerce among the
states” could either at most (and perhaps not even) cover only
activities crossing state lines, or it could parallel the power over
interstate commerce, which could not reach inside states by itself,
but could be extended to intrastate activities by means of the
affecting commerce test based on the necessary and proper clause.
Thus it seems clear that Stone believed that reaching inside states
via the interstate commerce power would require the necessary
and proper clause and reaching inside a state via the power to
regulate commerce among the several states either would require
the same assistance or would not be possible at all. In either case,
he had pulled back from Marshall’s statement that the power over
commerce among the states reaches of its own power that
commerce which affects more states than one, and instead
asserted that it could only do so with the help of the necessary and
proper clause.
Stone also stated that the “interstate commerce power” is the
actual power in the Constitution when he said that the power of
Congress is “the granted power. . . to regulate interstate
commerce.”92 To be sure, Stone presumably knew that the actual
words in the Constitution were not literally “interstate
commerce.” However, so entrenched had “interstate commerce”
become in Court and general discourse that apparently “interstate
commerce” was how Stone and presumably the rest of the Court
and much of the public had long conceived, expressed,
comprehended, and applied the actual words of the power to
regulate commerce among the several states.

92.

Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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But how a power can be granted in the Constitution even
though it is not stated there (and can possibly be broader than the
power that is granted there) is certainly quite a puzzle. Anyone
subscribing to the narrow “interstate commerce” view of the
meaning of the power over commerce who carefully read Stone’s
statement, especially someone already opposed to the New Deal’s
expansion of federal power in the first place, could well have
looked at Stone’s statement where the Court seemed to actually
state that it was going beyond the reach of the literal power stated
in the Constitution, as an expression of an imperial Court
stretching the Constitution beyond its proper bounds to extend
big government. Even if his statement was only an explanation of
why the necessary and proper clause had to be applied to reach
intrastate activities, many could still object. And if the power
“granted” in the Constitution really is the “interstate commerce”
power, perhaps they have a point!
In our view, however, the problem is not stretching the
“interstate commerce power” too far, as commonly argued, but
the Court’s narrowly conceiving of the power in the Constitution
as the “interstate commerce power” in the first place, and then
gradually extending the latter by the affecting commerce test or
similar extending doctrines. The force of the long-established
“interstate commerce” terminology and the appeal of the
interstate-intrastate dichotomy had become so great by the 1930s
that even while defending a newly broad application of “the
interstate commerce power” as necessary and proper to sustain
the New Deal, Stone reinforced the legitimation of artificially new
language and narrow doctrine, albeit arguably only reinventing in
a much more complicated way largely what Marshall had already
explicated over a century before.
Finally, in Darby Stone invoked a form of the term
“mingled” in explicating “interstate commerce.” Shortly after his
discussion of the necessary and proper clause quoted above, Stone
said “[a] familiar like exercise of power is the regulation of
intrastate transactions which are so commingled with or related to
interstate commerce that all must be regulated if the interstate
commerce is to be effectively controlled.” By using “comingled”
Stone might just as well have called it an exercise of the power to
regulate commerce among the several states, but like
predecessors and successors on the Court, Stone was apparently
unaware that “commingled with” arguably was the actual meaning
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of “among,” as stated in Gibbons and Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary.93
So enmeshed was Stone in the linguistic tangle of the interstateintrastate distinction that to extricate himself he unwittingly
deployed the original meaning of the Constitution as though it
were a new gloss necessary to adapt the Constitution to modern
circumstances. Stone’s elaborate explication of extraConstitutional language is further testimony to how “interstate
commerce” had replaced, unworkably narrowed, and generally
confused the meaning of what the Framers had arguably
understood “commerce among the several states” to mean in the
first place.
A few years later, in 1942, the Court decided Wickard v.
Filburn,94 generally regarded as extending the “interstate
commerce power” as far as it has ever gone in allowing the
regulation of activity inside states.95 Here, contrasting with the
enormous, international, vertically integrated industrial
conglomerate of Jones & Laughlin, the issue was whether a single
farmer, Filburn, could be fined for violating the second
Agricultural Adjustment Act by growing wheat for ‘personal’
consumption,96 beyond the amount of wheat allocated him under
the Act. Here the Court accepted the idea of regulating even very
minor productive activities inside a state if the individual activities
collectively as a class affected commerce, sometimes called the
“aggregation” test:
That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope
of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.97

This rationale laid the basis for cases in the 1960s and
afterwards upholding civil rights, environmental and other
regulations, many of which reach individual intrastate activities
93. See supra pp. 435–36.
94. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
95. However, we agree with Balkin that Wickard was actually not that much of an
extension of the power over commerce. BALKIN supra note 4, at 164–65.
96. How “personal” Filburn’s consumption of the additional wheat actually was is
debatable, since most of it went to feed his dairy cattle or poultry, whose products in turn
went to market, and for next year’s seed. Thus in reality, nearly all of Filburn’s wheat went
directly to market or substituted for it, and despite all the controversy, the case seems
clearly about commercial activity. Wickard, 317 U. S. at 114–15.
97. Id. at 127–28.
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that might be trivial and even non-economic in themselves, but
which collectively exert a substantial effect on “interstate
commerce.”98
And in again dismissing the “direct” versus “indirect” effects
test applied earlier to production in Knight and some other cases,
and sustaining federal regulation of “local” activity, Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Wickard applied the “affecting commerce”
doctrine. But even the broad application of doctrine by such a
master of words as Justice Jackson remained bound largely within
the discourse of “interstate commerce” and “intrastate” or “local”
activity:
even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such
effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as
“direct” or “indirect.”99

But arguably the Court’s extension of the “interstate
commerce power” through the affecting commerce test or similar
extending doctrines in Wickard and the other cases above
amounted largely to what we argue Chief Justice Marshall said
was the power to regulate commerce among the several states in
Gibbons in 1824, i.e., the power to regulate that commerce “that
concerns more states than one”—a power that regulates
“intercourse” “intermingled with” the states. The crucial
difference is that in Gibbons Marshall explicated the actual
language of the Constitution, so that for him going inside a state
was part of “commerce among the several states,” while in these
more recent New Deal era “interstate commerce” cases, adding
the “affecting commerce” test was necessary to reach “intrastate
commerce” or other activities which the original language of the
Constitution might have reached unaided. How originalists on the
modern Court and twentieth century scholars, especially
originalists and conservatives, have treated these extensions of
the “interstate commerce” power is a point to which we now
turn.100
98. See discussion supra p. 430.
99. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added).
100. This is not to say that the original understanding or Marshall in Gibbons did not
also include an “affecting commerce” test as part of the power to regulate commerce, only
to say that its application did not necessarily begin at the same restricted point somewhere
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D. MODERN ORIGINALISTS AND THE “INTERSTATE
COMMERCE” POWER
Many modern conservatives have attacked the Court’s broad
interpretation of the “interstate commerce power” since Jones &
Laughlin, or in some cases, even its narrower decisions during the
Progressive era, often on originalist grounds.101 To be sure, as
already mentioned,102 there are several dimensions to critiques of
the power over commerce among the several states, and because
of space limitations we deal here only with aspects of whether the
power extends inside states.
1. Conservative Originalists on the Modern Court
Many years after the New Deal Court first allowed broad use
of the commerce power beginning in 1937, a more conservative
Court in 1995 ended the long period of broad and essentially
unquestioned congressional use of that power. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in United States v.
Lopez,103 overturned the Gun Free School Zone Act as exceeding
the power over commerce among the several states, the first time
the Court had overturned a law passed only under that power
since 1936.104
After first reviewing the facts and providing an overview of
the development of commerce law, Rehnquist invoked
originalism with a call for a return to “first principles.”105 After
this portentous call, however, he repeatedly referred to the power
over activities inside states as stemming from the ability to
“affect” “interstate commerce”: “[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
that activity will be sustained.” In fact, Rehnquist wrote the
neologism “interstate commerce” a total of 56 times, while
along the mathematical line of a state boundary where it begins under “interstate
commerce.” See also infra at pp. 491–92 and 494–95.
101. See the Federalist Society reading lists on Federalism and the Commerce Power.
Roger Clegg et al., “Conservative and Libertarian Legal Scholarship: An Annotated
Bibliography”,
THE
FEDERALIST
SOCIETY
(2011),
https://fedsoc-cmspublic.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/urFFkbJ6p75qQKfGEoNvG84wzfbwqsaijgGRPtB
J.pdf. See also, David F. Forte, Commerce Among the Several States, in THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, 101 (David F. Forte, ed., 2005).
102. See supra p. 451.
103. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
104. With the brief exception of Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
105. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
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quoting the actual language of the Constitution, “commerce . . .
among the several states,” exactly two times, and once without
“several.”
Apparently, the conservative Chief Justice did not notice he
was applying “first principles” using language not invented until
well after the Constitution was written, nor did many
conservatives and originalists who praised the decision. But more
important is how “interstate commerce” thinking affected
Rehnquist’s reasoning: one of the key parts of the opinion is
where Rehnquist first considered how much something had to
affect commerce in order to be within the “interstate commerce”
power:
. . . Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to
regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
. . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce . . . . Within this final category, admittedly, our case
law has not been clear whether an activity must “affect” or
“substantially affect” interstate commerce in order to be within
Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause. . .
. We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law,
that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the
regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.106

Requiring the regulated activity to “substantially affect”
rather than just to “affect” interstate commerce more narrowly
construes and limits the reach of the “affecting commerce” test,
and hence narrows the reach of the “interstate commerce” power,
because to “substantially affect” something is more difficult than
merely to “affect it.”107 This is on top of the fact that, as discussed
more fully below, measuring effects—substantial or not—on
“interstate commerce” generally means measuring the effect that
something inside a state has on an activity at the state border
rather than on other activity inside a state, which is already
arguably more restrictive of the power. In turn, the latter could
require a longer reach of the “affecting commerce” test—i.e., the

106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (emphasis added).
107. Lopez also required that the activity must be “economic.” Id. at 560. But see
criticism of Rehnquist’s anachronistic conception of what is “economic” in Conrad J.
Weiler, Jr., “Explaining the Original Intent of Lopez to the Framers: Or, the Framers Spoke
Like Us, Didn’t They”?, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y, 163 (2004) [hereinafter Weiler,
Explaining].
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necessary and proper clause—than what would be required under
what we argue is the actual meaning of “among the several
states,”108 because the latter may already locate the commerce
that can be regulated inside states. Thus whatever affects
“commerce among the states” might already be quite close by
inside a state, while an effect on “interstate commerce” must be
measured to the mathematical line of the state border.
Related to that point, Rehnquist’s Lopez opinion, like
McKenna’s, Hughes’s, and Stone’s before him, referred to a form
of the term “mingle” to justify extending the “interstate
commerce” power, 109 apparently also like them, unaware of using
the very term that defined “among” in the first place with no need
for any extending corollaries. In paraphrasing the 1914 Shreveport
Rate Cases, Rehnquist said “the Court held that, where the
interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled
together that full regulation of interstate commerce required
incidental regulation of intrastate commerce, the Commerce
Clause authorized such regulation.”110 In this and the other
instances a form of “mingle” was applied in support of a
commerce-extending doctrine under the necessary and proper
clause to overcome the artificial narrowing of the power caused
by imposition of the anachronistic interstate-intrastate
dichotomy, even though the “mingle” meaning was already
arguably contained in the first place within the meaning of the
word “among” in the actual language of the Constitution, and
commerce power-extending doctrines might not even be needed.
In its recurring use of versions of “mingled” as if it were a helpful
new gloss to justify extending the “interstate commerce power,”
the Court is perhaps subconsciously recognizing the same reality
of the need to reach inside states that the Framers (and Marshall)
explicitly did in the first place when they wrote “among the
several states” instead of “between the states.”
Justice Thomas concurred in Lopez, making a very strong
conservative originalist argument for cutting back the commerce
clause even more than the majority opinion had. But his
originalism was perhaps more conservative than originalist, since
after calling for a return to the original meaning of the
Constitution and suggesting on originalist grounds that many
108.
109.
110.

See supra pp. 435–36 and infra Part IV.E.
Supra, pp. 435–36 459, 462, 468–69, and note 13.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added).
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more laws be overturned as exceeding the commerce power,111
Thomas used the term “interstate commerce” a total of thirty-two
times. To be sure, many of his mentions were quotes from other
cases as he argued that the “affecting commerce test” was
improper, but he never expressed any criticism of the use of
“interstate commerce” and seemed completely unaware of its
“unoriginalism.” Confirming this point, Thomas anachronistically
added in rejecting the “affecting commerce” test that “the
Framers could have drafted a Constitution that contained a
‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ clause had that been
their objective.”112 This is all the more ironic as elsewhere in the
same concurrence Thomas utilized Dr. Johnson’s 1773 Dictionary
to give a very selective reading of the supposed original meaning
of “commerce,”113 and completely (and inconsistently)
overlooked the absence from that Dictionary of “interstate.”114
But the larger point is that Justice Thomas apparently considered
“interstate commerce” in its narrow sense to actually be the
equivalent of what the Framers understood as “commerce . . .
among the several states,” and thus vulnerable to attack for being
overextended inside states via the “affecting commerce” test. 115
But while the “interstate commerce” power might arguably be
overextended, if “among the several states” is actually broader
than “interstate,” as we have argued, the power over commerce
among the several states could reach much of what Justice
Thomas rejects even without an affecting commerce test.

111. “[O]ur case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause. In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a
manner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the
original understanding of that Clause.” Id. at 584.
112. Id. at 588 (emphasis added). See infra pp. 494–96.
113. Selective, because in concluding that “commerce” meant “selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes,” Thomas first quoted Dr. Johnson’s
full definition of “commerce:” “‘[i]ntercour[s]e; exchange of one thing for another;
interchange of any thing; trade; traffick,’” but his analysis skipped right over “intercourse.”
Arguably, analyzing “intercourse” would have made arguing for Thomas’s narrow “selling
and buying” definition of “commerce” more difficult. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86.
114. Inconsistent use of dictionaries is not unknown in originalist analyses. See supra,
note 12.
115. Following Lopez, United States v. Morrison affirmed to the
conservative/originalist movement that Lopez was not a fluke. 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY
AND THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION, 112, 151 (2015). In Morrison
Rehnquist’s majority opinion used “interstate commerce” 36 times, and the actual
language of the Constitution once.
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2. “Interstate Commerce” in the Legal Academy and Beyond
a. Early Writers
Though here we can only review a tiny sampling of how the
legal literature has treated the “interstate commerce power,” with
a few prominent exceptions, “interstate commerce” seems to have
been fully accepted as the working language for analyzing the
constitutional power over commerce in the legal community and
beyond within less than a generation of its 1869 introduction and
continues to be so today. This is generally true even among most
originalists, especially among many who argue for narrow
interpretations of the power.
Among pre-New Deal writers with a narrow interpretation
of the power, for example, Robert E. Cushman’s 1919 article,
“The Police Power Under the Commerce Clause” criticized those
who would broaden the commerce power beyond its then narrow
interpretation, though he argued that it already had a broad
interpretation, and portrayed the power Congress had recently
begun exercising over food and drugs and railroad safety as an
improper exercise of a federal police power.116 He uncritically and
frequently used the term “interstate” as though it were the
original language of the Constitution, and gave it the narrow
“between” meaning. For example, he quite anachronistically said
that “perhaps the most important cause for the formation and
adoption of our federal constitution was the desire to establish a
government with power to regulate foreign and interstate
commerce. . . .”117 Later he wrote about “congressional
responsibility for the safe, free, uninterrupted flow of commerce
between the states . . . .”118 Similarly, in a 1932 book on the
commerce clause, Professor Gavit wrote that “prior to the
adoption of the Constitution the phrase “interstate and foreign
commerce” had no particular legal significance.”119 This is
indisputably correct since the word “interstate” did not yet exist,
but this stunningly anachronistic statement from an expert shows
how completely the legal community had convinced itself within
116. Robert E. Cushman, The Police Power Under the Commerce Clause, 3 MINN. L.
REV. 289 (1919).
117. Id. at 309.
118. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
119. BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, 100 (1932).
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a few years of the introduction of “the interstate commerce
power” that it was the constitutional power. Even Albert Abel, in
what was in many ways a thorough and originalist, though also
conservative, analysis of the origins of the power to regulate
commerce among the states, frequently used “interstate
commerce” and “between the states” as the equivalent of the
actual language of the Constitution.120 For example, in surveying
the documents of the Framing era, he says “[t]he only thing
approaching a full discussion of the power over interstate
commerce is found in The Federalist, where it was touched on
three times . . . .”121 Of course, The Federalist never discussed
“interstate commerce.” Elsewhere Abel paraphrased a Framer’s
words that literally said “among the several states” as “between
the states.”122 These early discussions demonstrate “interstate
commerce’s” early dominance and narrow embodiment of the
power over commerce, and show how long and often both the
Court and the legal community have convinced themselves that
“interstate commerce” is actually the language as well as the
meaning of the Constitution.
Even Professor Corwin, who also claimed in 1936 to be
interpreting the original understanding, while arriving at what
today would be considered “liberal” conclusions that the
commerce power was very broad and reached insides states,
frequently and uncritically used the term “interstate commerce”
even while arguing against several of the Court’s commercenarrowing doctrines. While he never explicitly discussed the
meanings of “between” versus “among” or “interstate,” he clearly
argued that the power to regulate commerce among the several
states could go inside states. So his use of “interstate commerce”
did not carry the “between” meaning, but so far as we can tell he
is the only scholar before recent years to examine original
evidence who regularly used the term “interstate commerce”

120. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941).
121. Id. at 473.
122. Sherman, enumerating the main functions of the federal government, lists the
duties “‘to preserve . . . a beneficial intercourse among themselves [the states”], . . .’ The
language is interesting; the beneficial intercourse between the states was merely to be
preserved” . . . .” The italics are added to show how Abel deftly and perhaps unconsciously
reduced Sherman’s “among” to “between” so as to support his own general thesis. Id. at
473 (emphasis added).
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while arguing broadly for a power to go inside states.123 A year
later, the soon to be Justice, Professor Felix Frankfurter, also an
advocate of broad application of the power over commerce
among the states, wrote anachronistically regarding Justice
Taney, saying he “furthered his general policy of giving restrictive
scope to the Commerce Clause by narrowing the conception of
interstate commerce[,]” and emphasized the “geographical
dichotomy between state and interstate commerce.”124 This
reinforces our point above about Taney’s narrow dual federalist
views of the power over commerce,125 but also shows that even
before joining the Court, Frankfurter already conceptualized the
power in the Constitution to be the “interstate commerce” power
contrasting with apparent “intrastate” power.
But a few broad commerce power advocates in and after the
1930s did argue that “interstate commerce” was being used to
convey an improperly narrow meaning of the power over
commerce among the states. In 1937 Hamilton and Adair’s major
critique of narrow views of the commerce power briefly
mentioned the “interstate” theory, pointing out that the word
“interstate” did not exist at the Founding, and that the use of
“interstate commerce” instead of “among” contributed to an idea
of “separation of dominions between state and nation” that did
not exist regarding commerce at the Framing.126 But apparently
the only extended criticism of the use of “interstate” and the
results of substituting it for “among the states” was by Crosskey.
Crosskey heavily criticized what he called “the interstate theory”
of the commerce power, or “the interstate limitation,” i.e., “the
moving of persons, things, and intelligence, from the territory of
one state to the territory of another.”127 He attributed its rise to the
pre-Civil War effort beginning with Taney to narrow the power
over commerce so that it would not threaten states’ rights, and
presumably slavery, and then its adaptation after the Civil War
123. See generally, CORWIN, supra note 21, at Chs. 5–6, 171–72, 209.
124. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE POWER UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE, 59–60 (Quadrangle Paperbacks 1964) (1937) (emphasis added).
125. Supra pp. 437–38.
126. WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO GOVERN: THE
CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW, 142 (1937). Stern earlier briefly also noted how
“interstate” narrowed the understanding of the power, but undertook no analysis. Robert
L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L REV. 1335,
1348 (1934).
127. CROSSKEY, supra note 6 at 17–19. Curiously he did not comment on interstate’s
post-constitutional origins.
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into the “interstate theory” by a Court increasingly committed to
laissez-faire policies.128
But despite the Court’s narrow phrasing of the power over
commerce among the several states as “interstate,” Crosskey
agreed that it had nonetheless extended the power over
commerce inside states through doctrines such as the directindirect doctrine of Knight,129 or later, as in Jones and Laughlin,130
based on whether something substantially affected interstate
commerce, even if not defined as commerce at all. However,
Crosskey thought these doctrines would not have been necessary
if the Court had stayed with the original broad understanding of
the power over commerce among the several states, and were
possibly not themselves even constitutional, but they had evolved
because of the need to get around the confines of the “interstate
doctrine.” Otherwise, without these compensating doctrines, he
argued, under the interstate theory, virtually everything inside a
state was “intrastate,” and, going back to Taney, left to the state
to regulate.
Crosskey concluded that these corollary “interstate
commerce”—extending doctrines did not reach what he believed
to be the full extent of the power over commerce—but that was
because he defined “commerce” as “all gainful activity” inside
states and states as the people of the states.131 While we do not
agree that “commerce” was so broadly understood,132 nor that
“states” were not governmental units, those points are beyond the
scope of this article. We do think Crosskey correctly argued that
the general embrace of the “interstate theory” forced the Court
to adopt a variety of corollary rationales when it wanted to extend
the commerce power inside states beyond its “interstate”
limitation.133 After all, if the power to regulate commerce among
the several states could go inside states to regulate “that
commerce which affects more states than one,” as Marshall said,
even if the commerce did not itself move across state lines, then
128. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 47, 287–88. As did CORWIN, supra note 21, at 131,
257–58, as well as many others.
129. Supra pp. 456–57.
130. Supra pp. 464–65.
131. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 50–55.
132. For one, the Framers distinguished between “commerce” and “economy,” both
of which described “gainful” activities, but only the former was understood to be subject
to regulation. See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107, at 173–76, 182–93.
133. CROSSKEY, supra note 6, at 18.
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the affecting commerce test is not needed, or is not needed as
much. Nor does one need a “stream” or “current of commerce,”
nor a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,”134
to reach inside a state, if “among” already means to go inside a
state to those activities which are mingled with those activities
that concern more states than one.
Since Crosskey, however, there seems to have been little
academic examination of the continuing substitution of
“interstate commerce” for “commerce among the several states,”
and the term’s use is either normally taken for granted, or (in our
opinion properly) used as the equivalent of “between,” which in
turn is often (in our opinion improperly) argued to be the actual
meaning of “among the several states.”135
b. Modern Writers
In recent decades, Raoul Berger, a founder of modern
conservative originalism,136 concluded that “among” meant
“between,” partly based on such evidence as the fact that the
Framers themselves sometimes used “between,” and the idea that
the Framers intended only to stop obstacles to trade at state
borders.137 After accusing Chief Justice Marshall of an
“importation” of the meaning of “commerce” in Gibbons,138
Berger ironically and self-servingly then himself imported
“interstate commerce” and “between” into the rest of his chapter
on the commerce power.139 “Undoubtedly Congress has power to
govern commerce between the States . . . . Nor was the inter-state
grant all-embracing.” Similarly with Bork and Troy, the late Judge
Bork being another progenitor of contemporary modern
conservative originalism who also regularly and uncritically used
the term “interstate commerce” while expounding the Framers’
original understanding of commerce. For example, in discussing
134. See supra pp. 460, 464.
135. The examples are legion, we have cited only a few prominent examples.
136. JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 129–
32 (2005). Though some of Berger’s methods are now rejected by some modern originalists
as not properly focused on the “original understanding,” their conclusions regarding
commerce are often the same as his.
137. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 126–33 (1987). See
supra text pp. 451–455 and accompanying notes regarding the Framers’ use of “among”
and “between.”
138. BERGER, supra note 137, at 124.
139. E.g., BERGER, supra note 137, at 123, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 144, 145, 156.
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the meaning of the power over commerce among the states, they
anachronistically call it “interstate commerce” and correctly but
largely irrelevantly equate the latter to “between”: “[i]nterstate
commerce seems to refer to interstate trade—that is, . . .
‘transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities
between the . . . citizens of different states.’”140 But the real
question is not whether “interstate” is similar to “between,” which
it unquestionably is, but what is the meaning of “among.”
The modern libertarian originalist Richard Epstein also
seems to follow the “interstate theory,” though his primary focus
is on the supposedly overbroad definition of “commerce,”
beginning in the Progressive Era. He anachronistically says
regarding Gibbons that “Marshall decided . . . that navigation
among the several states was interstate commerce,”141 and quotes
Marshall’s statement about leaving to the states that commerce
which is “completely internal,” but like many conservatives leaves
off Marshall’s qualifying phrase at the sentence’s end, “and which
does not extend to or affect other states.” Moreover, Epstein’s
general discussion heavily employs the language of interstate
commerce and the “interstate-intrastate” distinction. Regarding
the necessary and proper clause, he ties it to “interstate
commerce” by saying that it “permits the regulation of local
affairs that are in a sense inseparable from national ones, as
happens when local and interstate cars, for example, move along
the same line.”142 Of course, the meaning of “among” is “mingled
with,” which “local and interstate cars. . . along the same line”
would seem to exemplify with no further qualification, so that
arguably Epstein’s approach like others would require the
necessary and proper clause to reach that which “among the
several states” already reaches unaided as an original and textual
matter.
Another example of how deeply entrenched is the belief that
the Constitution has the “between” meaning is shown by two
writers praising Justice Thomas’s narrow view of the power over
commerce in Lopez. They say that under Justice Thomas’s view
“the power ‘to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States’
140. Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of
Congress’s Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863–64 (2002)
(emphasis added).
141. Epstein, supra note 77, at 1401 (emphasis added).
142. Epstein, supra note 77, at 1398.
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would be interpreted to cover only what the Constitution literally
says: “the power to regulate commerce (buying and selling things)
across state lines.”143 Of course, what the Constitution literally says
is not “across state lines” but “among the several states,” and
whether the latter only means “across state lines” is very much the
issue, but this exemplifies again the deep-seated and apparently
unconscious assumption even among scholars that “among” not
only means but actually is written as “interstate” or “between.”
In contrast, Randy Barnett, a leading original understanding
originalist, largely avoids the term “interstate commerce,”
instead, assimilating “among the several states” to “between the
several states” based on originalist evidence.144 But even though
he focuses on transmuting “among” into “between” to reach
narrow conclusions, as opposed to those who argue that the
neologism “interstate commerce” has been extended too far, that
is exactly the point. Barnett still has the initial (and in our opinion
heavy) burden of proving in the final analysis along with Abel,
Berger, and others that “among” means “between,”145 despite the
fact that the Constitution says “among,” not “between.”
An overview of the modern conservative original
understanding of the Constitution is presented in The Heritage
Guide to the Constitution. Regarding commerce among the
several states it generously acknowledges Marshall’s “inside a
state” view of “among,” but says “some commentators have
defined ‘among the several states’ as the trading and movement
of goods between two or more states. . .” 146 Obviously, the latter
point refers to the narrow “interstate” meaning of “among “
argued and accepted by most conservatives (as discussed above)
as the true meaning of “among,”147 and The Guide’s discussion
itself mentions “interstate commerce” about four times as often

143. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and
the Partial Birth Abortion Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 75 (1997) (emphasis added). See supra
p. 492 for Justice Thomas’s view.
144. Barnett, Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 132–36, citing Framing era use of
“between” as evidence of the actual and understood meaning of “among.” See supra note
16.
145. A burden which, in our opinion, has not been met, though that issue is largely
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we did touch briefly on it, supra pp. 434–36, 476–
79, and note 13, and infra pp. 482–83.
146. Forte, supra note 101, at 102 (emphasis added). On Marshall’s view see supra pp.
451–54.
147. See Part IV.D.1, IV.D.2.a and IV.D.2.b to p. 482.
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as the actual constitutional language.148 Additionally, a recent
sympathetic historian of conservative originalism criticized the
New Deal Court’s “logic of the living Constitution” for
abandoning “categorical distinctions arguably related to the text
and original intent of the Commerce Clause” such as “whether
commerce was interstate or intrastate.”149 But if making up new
words and distinctions such as “interstate” versus “intrastate” and
calling them the Constitution is originalist, it makes one wonder
what real difference there is between “originalism” and the long
castigated conservative straw man of “living constitutionalism.”
Recent originalist scholars who conclude that the power over
commerce among the several states was a broad power, like
Corwin earlier, do not confront “interstate commerce.” For
example, while Nelson and Pushaw do not directly say that the
meaning of “among the several states” was to go inside states,
they extensively quote Marshall’s language in Gibbons defining
“among” as applying to “that commerce which concerns more
states than one,” and cite an array of programs inside states that
they argue is justified by the power.150 We think that they correctly
conclude that the Gibbons Court “recognized that Congress could
regulate wholly intrastate commerce . . . if it was connected with
commerce in at least one other state.”151 But in accepting the
actual meaning that we argue “among” already had as expressed
in the “affecting more states than one” principle, by using
148. Forte, supra note 101, at 101–07.
149. O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM, supra note 136, at 34–35. In broadly arguing that
Holmesian legal realism eventually resulted in “living constitutionalism” by overturning
the formal and categorical distinctions of the Knight Court, O’Neill makes the
questionable assumption, at least regarding commerce, that categorical distinctions of preNew Deal courts such as “interstate-intrastate” were somehow more originalist than the
New Deal Court’s decisions. Cushman similarly traces the rise and fall of formalistic
categories, with an excellent analysis of Justice Jackson wrestling with the problem of
extending the “interstate commerce” clause to local consumption in Wickard. See Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1089 (2000). He concludes that “[t]he anachronism of studying doctrinal development
through the categories comprising the modern constitutional sensibility only compounds
the error” of tracing doctrine topically instead of synchronically. Id. at 1149. But Cushman
misses the bigger chronicity problem by failing to examine the underlying linguistic
problems and resultant doctrinal issues inherent in the Court’s equating “interstate
commerce” with “commerce . . . among the several states” and trying to regulate commerce
among the several states under the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy.
150. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. Rev. 1 (1999).
151. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
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“intrastate,” they perhaps inadvertently invoke the “interstateintrastate” distinction. Though they would still uphold the vast
majority of commerce power legislation under the “substantially
affecting commerce” test, they think it too broad.152 It is thus not
clear if their conclusion that the substantial effects test is too
broad is affected by their apparent conceptualization of “among
the several states” in terms of the narrow interstate-intrastate
dichotomy.
Jack Balkin also applies originalist tools to conclude that the
power over commerce among the states was originally understood
to be a broad power. He agrees that in Gibbons Marshall ruled
that regulation could reach inside a state, even to activity not
crossing a state line, but argues that in dictum regarding the
inspection clause Marshall limited the power over production,
though Balkin’s own reading of original sources based on the
Virginia Resolution would allow for a very broad reach of the
power inside states.153 Perhaps because of this, Balkin does not
focus on the use of “interstate” versus “among.” Douglas Kmiec
also relies on the Virginia Resolution, and argues that it justifies
a broad “inside” meaning of “among the several states.” While he
largely uses the language of “interstate commerce,” and while
critical of the “substantially affecting commerce” test, he would
extend federal power inside states to reach commercial activity
where there is a national purpose or the states were separately
incompetent.154
Constitutional law texts also seem to accept the dominance
of “interstate commerce.” Gunther and Sullivan somewhat
neutrally entitled their chapter on the power to regulate
commerce “The Commerce Power,” but in the opening sentence
of the introduction said “[a] national regulatory power over
interstate commerce was a major motivation for the framing of the
Constitution. . . .”155 Lawrence Tribe headed his discussion of the
power over commerce among the states as “The Power to
Regulate Interstate Commerce. . . .”156
152. Id. at 158.
153. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 140–49, 180.
154. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Rediscovering a Principled Commerce Power, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 547 (2001).
155. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119
(14th ed., 2001) (emphasis added).
156. 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807 (3rd ed. 2000).
Political Science, the most frequent undergraduate major for law students, also generally
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In sum, for the first eighty years of its existence the Supreme
Court largely used the literal or near-literal original language of
the middle part of Article I, sec. 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution,
“commerce . . . among the several states,” in dealing with the
regulation of domestic commerce, though as also noted above, the
Court also but less frequently referred to “commerce between the
states,” a phrase with an arguably narrower meaning. The
occasional use of “between,” which might have been quite
appropriate to the facts of individual cases, changed very rapidly
however, with the Court’s discovery and embrace of the term
“interstate” in 1869, a term that arguably meant the same thing as
“between the several states.” The Court increasingly applied
“interstate” to all challenges to the application of the national
commerce power, especially challenges to the rising tide of federal
legislation beginning in the late 1800s, itself increasingly based on
the “interstate commerce” power. From the very moment of its
introduction into a majority opinion in 1869, which seemed to
legitimate its use, the term “interstate commerce” ascended,
within two decades swamping use of the actual language of the
Constitution, and continuing its dominance right up to the
present. Since its introduction, “interstate commerce,” often
paired with “intrastate,” has been used voluntarily or mostly so by
the Court in over two thousand cases for a total of over eleven
thousand uses, far more than the actual language of the
Constitution, so that for all practical purposes “interstate
commerce” is the working language of the Court regarding the
power in question, generally conveying a narrower meaning that
is arguably required by the Constitution. Even while making
major doctrinal changes, the Court has remained within the
language of “interstate commerce,” relying on commerceextending doctrines to expand the reach of the power inside
states. Thus, for most of the existence of the Constitution, and
during essentially all of the time that Congress has actively
regulated commerce among the states, the power to regulate
refers to this part of the Constitution as “the interstate commerce power.” For example,
KAREN O’CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE (2004) which described itself as “best-selling,” on p. 77, anachronistically
discussed Gibbons as construing the power over “interstate commerce.” Also, their index
cited “interstate commerce,” and virtually all such texts do this. The examples in academe
generally of the dominance of “interstate commerce” are legion; the term is ubiquitous
and widely accepted as the meaning if not the actual language of the Constitution without
a second thought.
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commerce among the several states has been conceptualized and
dealt with by the courts as the “interstate commerce power.”
Within the legal community generally, originalist or not, and
whether reaching broad or narrow conclusions, “interstate
commerce” has so permeated the legal (and popular) mind that
for well over a century the assumption apparently has been that
the two phrases—the actual language of the Constitution, and
“interstate commerce”—are identical in (an often narrow)
meaning, and that “interstate commerce” is the proper term by
which to describe and interpret the relevant constitutional
language. The legal community generally relies on the term to
convey the meaning of the regulation of commerce among the
several states, often in a more narrow way than we argue is
warranted by the actual meaning of “among the several states.”
Within the legal community, while the Federalist Society has
actively developed much of the intellectual capital and contact
network supporting the conservative turn on the Supreme Court
in the last few decades, and conservatives have carefully
developed a narrower and often “originalist” interpretation of the
power over commerce among the several states to oppose the
broader interpretations of the liberals and “living
constitutionalists,”157 their own discourse and their opposition to
“living constitutionalists” (as well as the discourse of the latter)
ironically still occur largely within the anachronistic and
unoriginal linguistic framework of “interstate commerce.” 158
Thus the fact of the overwhelming dominance for well over a
century of the term “interstate commerce” in legal and popular
discussions of the federal power over commerce among the
several states is unquestionable. The main questions are why this
change, and, most important, whether it makes any important
difference, points to which we now turn.

157. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 96–103. It is also an interesting question as
to how “originalist” a set of interpretations carefully constructed by a political movement
two centuries after the fact to serve current policy goals can truly be.
158. Although in itself this is not unknown with other parts of the Constitution; see
supra note 1 regarding reliance on Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and
state” rather than the actual language of the Establishment Clause, but our concern is with
the lack of recognition that such a change has occurred.
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E. Why Did the Court Adopt “Interstate Commerce” in 1869,
but Not Drop it in 1937 (or 1995)?
As to why the Court first turned to “interstate commerce,”
we should first consider whether it was largely a result of litigation
over language in legislation using “interstate commerce.” While
statutory litigation has greatly added to the mentions of
“interstate commerce” in Court cases, as discussed above, we
have removed most such references from our data, the bulk of
which concerned the Interstate Commerce Act,159 so legislation
does not account for the Court’s overwhelming use of the term in
place of the actual constitutional language as shown above in
Tables 1 and 2. Moreover, the Court itself adopted the term
“interstate commerce” in 1869, eighteen years before the passage
of the first national legislation to use the term, the Interstate
Commerce Act,160 and another five years before the Court’s first
case involving the Act, in 1892. In those twenty-three years, the
Court used the term “interstate commerce” entirely on its own in
93 majority opinions, for a total of 325 uses in those opinions,
while using “commerce among the several states” in 94 majority
opinions, a total of 273 times. This suggests that, if anything, the
causality might be the reverse, with the Court’s adoption of
“interstate commerce” promoting its use by Congress and the
general public. Moreover, after the Court introduced the term
“interstate commerce,” in 1869, the rate of use of “commerce
among the several states” immediately decreased, before any
litigation came to the Court involving “interstate commerce” in
legislation, as shown above in Table 1, and by the decade 1910–
1919 the rate of usage of the language of the Constitution was less
than two times per opinion and has remained at that level since.
And since the 1990’s, the constitutional language has been
mentioned less than only one and a third times per case that
mentioned it at all, which was not nearly as many times as cases
mentioning “interstate commerce.” So there definitely seems to
have been and still is a strong preference by the Court for
“interstate commerce” regardless of legislation.
But given the Court’s already existing generally narrow
interpretation of the power over commerce among the several
states in 1869, when the Court adopted “interstate commerce,”

159.
160.

Supra Part III.D.
Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 137 (1869).
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there was less to the linguistic change than meets the eye. In other
words, the Court did not change doctrine by adopting “interstate
commerce” so much as simply rename and increasingly emphasize
the preexisting narrow commerce power doctrine it had largely
followed since the late 1830s.
Perhaps as puzzling as why the Court adopted “interstate
commerce” in the first place is why it did not replace the term in
the “constitutional revolution” of 1937 when it greatly expanded
the reach of the power over commerce among the states. Certainly
some scholars were already criticizing the Court’s narrow
interpretation of the power over commerce among the several
states as expressed through the “interstate” theory, as noted
above.161 So if ever there were a time to change terminology to
mark a major change in direction, this was it. Moreover, the Court
could have justified its change in direction by reverting to the
original language of the Constitution and arguing that it was
merely returning to original meaning of the Constitution.162 But
instead the Court actually intensified its reliance on “interstate
commerce,” applying broad commerce power-extending
doctrines to justify expansion of the power. Perhaps the Court
lacked the scholarly capital it might have needed to return to the
original language and to give it a broad meaning, or itself doubted
that the original meaning was broad enough to support where the
Court wanted to go.163 Or perhaps it felt that it was making enough
of a substantive change in direction in 1937 without also calling
more attention to that change by making a major change in the
language that the country had become accustomed to, however
anachronistic that language was, in a kind of verbal pathdependency that partially concealed enormous actual change.164
161. See pp. 476–79 above for contemporary scholarly criticism of the Court. There
was also strong criticism from the President, Congress and the public. O’BRIEN, supra note
42, at 60–68, 573–74. It might also be asked why the Court did not revert to the actual
constitutional language in its early 1900s decisions, outlined above at Part IV.B, when it
first began to develop its commerce power extending doctrines, and when the adoption of
“interstate commerce” language was still in living memory.
162. In his speech introducing his “Court-packing plan,” Roosevelt argued that the
Court should “enforce the Constitution as written.” O’BRIEN, supra note 42, at 62–63.
163. Though Hollis-Brusky argues that there was significant legal intellectual capital
to draw upon in the New Deal era to support expanding the reach of the power over
commerce, as reviewed above, that literature also largely expressed itself as dealing with
“interstate commerce.” See supra Part IV.C and HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 165–
66.
164. Hollis-Brusky and others correctly note that there is a strong tendency toward
path-dependency in Court jurisprudence. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 149–51.
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Also puzzling is why, in 1995, when the Lopez Court made
the first real limitation in Commerce Clause doctrine since 1937—
and did so moreover while claiming to represent “first principles”
atop a rising tide of conservative originalism—the Court
continued to discourse in the distinctly unoriginal language of
“interstate commerce” and “intrastate.” Perhaps the simplest
answer is that no one cared or noticed. A more cynical answer
might be that in Lopez practical conservatism outweighed
theoretical originalism, perhaps because too frankly opening up
the can of worms of the actual original meaning of “among the
several states” and the “interstate” doctrine might confuse things
and pose more problems for conservatives than solutions, since it
is much easier for conservatives to argue, as already discussed,
that the “interstate commerce power” has been overly extended
by the “affecting commerce” test to reach inside states than to
argue that “among” means “between” and does not of its own
meaning reach inside states.165
In sum, for whatever reason, through major changes in how
the Court applies it, for well over a century the Court has
voluntarily continued to use the term “interstate commerce” far
more than it has used the actual language of the Constitution.
F. So What? Implications of Reliance on the Interstate
Commerce Power
Despite Lopez and what we argue is the narrow bias of
“interstate commerce,” as actually applied and with the help of
various extending doctrines based on the necessary and proper
clause, the modern “interstate commerce” power is still broad,166
and arguably corresponds roughly in practice to what we argue
was Marshall’s view and evidence of the original understanding of
“commerce among the several states.”167 However, there are still
However, here we would distinguish between path-dependency in continuation of
doctrinal language, and path-dependency in the actual application of the doctrine. While
path-dependency may be the best explanation for the continuation of the words and the
fundamental “between” concept of the “interstate commerce” doctrine, obviously its
application through the various corollary doctrines we outlined above has varied since the
1890’s. Path-dependency also does not explain the rapid but apparently completely
unquestioned adoption of “interstate commerce” in the first place.
165. Supra pp. 435–36; see generally Part IV.C, and infra p. 490.
166. See generally, Kmiec, supra note 154.
167. Obviously, many conservatives and some originalists will disagree with our
conclusions and continue to argue for greater limits on the power over commerce, but
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legal and policy reasons for concern about the all-pervasive
dominance of “the interstate commerce power.”
First, to be sure, the Court had developed commerce power
narrowing doctrines well before it adopted “interstate
commerce.” However, especially when paired with “intrastate,”
“interstate commerce” became its own self-limiting text and
doctrine, because the words themselves so clearly and strongly
conveyed the narrow meaning of only crossing state boundaries.
If “interstate commerce” is the language and meaning of the
Constitution, nothing more is needed to define federal power as
limited to crossing state boundaries, at least without assistance
from the necessary and proper clause. In contrast, while “among
the several states” is not as self-evidently clear in its meaning, it is
also not on its face literally or clearly limited to crossing state
lines, and arguably extends inside more states than one. Thus, to
the considerable extent that “interstate” and “intrastate
commerce” have replaced the actual words of the Constitution on
the Court and in the public mind, these neologisms facially
privilege a narrow understanding of the power in the Constitution
in a way that earlier or other limiting doctrines did not. The
general acceptance and unquestioning use of such language not
just as doctrine but as if it were the literal words of the
Constitution cements a narrow view of the power in the public
mind far more effectively than if the Court had to struggle with
elaborate and obscure explanations of how “among” in the
Constitution really meant “between,” especially in the face of its
rejection by Marshall in Gibbons,168 or with Tenth Amendment
arguments about how principles of federalism prohibit regulating
activity inside states even if it is of national economic
importance.169 In sum, the originalist and linguistic case that
“among” really means “between” is neither self-evident nor as
facially strong as the argument that “interstate” means
“between.” And though obviously this is and will be disputed, that
hopefully without relying on interstate or intrastate commerce. See Justice Thomas’s view,
supra note 113 and accompanying text. See also supra Part IV.C.1.
168. In RESTORING, Barnett very briefly reviews and rejects Marshall’s interpretation
of “among” in Gibbons and does not consider it at all in Original Meaning. RESTORING,
supra note 14, at 301–02, and Original Meaning, supra note 14 at 132–36. As noted supra
note 14, he also did not consider Dr. Johnson’s definition of “among.”
169. To be sure, it is sometimes argued that the Tenth Amendment limits federal
power to specific (though unwritten) functions or that certain functions are specifically left
to the states.
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is exactly the point-the meaning of the actual constitutional
language is readily arguable to be much broader than its
anachronistic gloss.
Thus, if we are debating the meaning of “among,” especially
as originalists, the initial burden is on those who want to prove
that “among” means “between” instead of “mingled with,” or “on
every side,” and to explain why the text of the Constitution did
not just say “between,” if that was the meaning.170 Then they must
account for the neologisms “interstate” and “intrastate,” which
did not appear in Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary or any publication for
nearly another century, or simply jettison these misleading
neologisms, which would be the proper thing to do. Perhaps they
can meet this burden, but that is the point: dealing with the actual
language of the Constitution—“among”—imposes a greater
burden of proof and explanation on the protagonist of a narrow
meaning than dealing with “interstate commerce.”
But once it is believed and accepted that “interstate
commerce” and “intrastate” are the actual language of the
Constitution, or its precise embodiment, which belief seems to
have been widespread for well over a century, there is no easy
defense against the “between” meaning of “interstate.” This is
because “interstate” by definition really does mean “between the
states,” and the burden of proof then shifts to those arguing for a
broader meaning of “interstate” than “between” states, and in
turn this (usually) helps justify conservative arguments about an
overreaching Court and federal power generally. Thus the Court’s
virtual abandonment of the original language of the Constitution
in favor of appealingly straight-forward though totally ersatz
language, besides being anachronistic and misleading (and just
plain wrong, in our opinion), also improperly shifts the initial
burden of proof to those propounding the broader, “inside”
meaning of the power over commerce among the states.
Second, the “interstate commerce power” as currently
extended inside states is vulnerable to attack, in part-as shown in
Lopez—because to reach much “intrastate” activity it requires a
considerable extension of the “interstate commerce” power by
means of commerce-extending doctrines often based on the
necessary and proper clause.

170.

See supra pp. 469–82 and notes 14 and 168, and infra pp. 492 and 495–96.
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For example, Wickard’s “aggregation” test, often cited (and
criticized) as the high-water mark of the Court’s extension of the
“interstate commerce power,” was presumably based on the
necessary and proper clause supplementing “the interstate
commerce” power. Thus, if measured geographically, the starting
point for application of the necessary and proper clause to
Filburn’s wheat would have been the “interstate” line—the
Indiana-Ohio border—and the physical distance that the
necessary and proper clause would have had to cover would have
been the distance from that line to the billions of wheat kernels
on Filburn’s farm in Montgomery County, likely several miles
inside the state. This is also a considerable conceptual distance for
those who argue that the broad extension of the commerce power
especially since 1937 is a danger to liberty and federalism.171 But
if we assume that Filburn planted, grew and harvested all of his
wheat together, mingling the wheat ultimately to be kept at home
with that to be sold, and only separating out after harvest the
wheat for truly “personal”172 use from that for sale, for his cattle,
for his poultry, and for next year’s seed, then if the federal power
were defined as the power over intercourse or transactions
mingled with the states and that affect more states than one, it
could more readily be concluded that the entire process was
commerce among the states from the spring day Filburn first
sowed the wheat, and certainly at and past the time of harvest. At
most, the necessary and proper clause would have come into play
in the form of “affecting commerce” only to cover the microscopic
distance between one kernel of wheat on a stalk or in a container
that would end up in “personal” use and the adjoining kernel in a
container destined for the wider market, or to replace the market,
and not to reach over the miles of distance from a kernel on his

171. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, 93–103 (reviewing conservative and Federalist
Society critiques of expansive comerce power based on Wickard and other decisions). But
as to the degree that states should be independent economic units, see James Madison,
Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS
CONSTITUTION 348–57 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987) (complaining
bitterly about states as a danger to liberty, especially economic liberty). For a modern view
of states as lesser, though still significant, barriers to broader trade see Conrad J. Weiler,
Jr., The United States of America, in INTERNAL MARKETS AND MULTI-LEVEL
GOVERNANCE 160–95 (George Anderson, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Weiler, United].
172. See discussion supra pp. 469–70.
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farm that potentially affected transactions at the state border to
the actual “interstate” border.173
Thus, “interstate” as the starting point for applying the
necessary and proper clause is a considerably more remote
starting point from the “local, non-commercial” activity that was
some portion of Filburn’s farming than if the commerce being
affected was already inside his farm, i.e., among the states and
mingled with the wheat kernels being grown on the farm which
was part of a national market in wheat inside and affecting more
states than one. In turn, the justification for and reach of the
application of the “affecting commerce” test or some other
formula under the necessary and proper clause must usually be
far more extended under the “interstate commerce”
conceptualization than under the “inside states” or “intermingled
with” conceptualization of “among.” In the latter case the
necessary and proper clause might not need to be extended nearly
as far, or perhaps not be invoked at all. Similarly, “intrastate” is
far broader, more all-encompassing and exclusive of “interstate
commerce” activity inside states right up to the state or interstate
line than mingled commercial and noncommercial activity inside
states that might also be commerce among the several states.
In other words, as a matter of “original principles,” is the
starting point for the application of the federal power over
commerce “among the several states” a point along the
“interstate” framework of the “mathematical lines” of the
boundaries of the states which Marshall rejected in Gibbons, and
which textually is all there is when seen in the context of the
“interstate-intrastate” distinction, or, is the starting point for the
regulation of commerce the actual commercial intercourse and
intermingling that exists inside more states than one, as well as
between states? This might also be relevant to the question raised
in Lopez174 and reemphasized in Morrison175 as to whether there
is a “jurisdictional element” connecting the activity to be
regulated to “interstate commerce.” If the jurisdictional element
must connect to “interstate commerce,” i.e., crossing a state
boundary, that might exclude some activities inside a state
173. To be sure, this analysis might not end the argument that this might still be too
much federal power, but it does arguably reduce the amount of federal “overreach” that
is being disputed.
174. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552–53 (1995).
175. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
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altogether and require a greater reach of the jurisdictional
element than one connecting activity already inside a state to
commerce among the several states.176
The relevance of all this rests in part on the fact that two
justices who were also in the Lopez majority explicitly criticized
parts of doctrines extending the “interstate commerce power”
inside states. The first, the late Justice Scalia, concurring in
Gonzalez v. Raich said that the “substantially affecting interstate
commerce” test is “misleading” because “activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of
interstate commerce,” and thus the power to regulate them comes
from the necessary and proper clause.177 Scalia was arguing
correctly as a textual matter (but from our viewpoint also
irrelevantly and unoriginally) that those activities that
substantially affect “interstate commerce” are not themselves
interstate commerce, presumably because they are “intrastate.”178
But again, our point is that many commercial activities that
are inside a state —”intrastate”— and that are thus textually not
“interstate commerce” might nonetheless actually still be
“commerce among the several states,” i.e., inside more states than
one.179 Consequently, as a textual matter, some “intrastate”
commerce might not qualify as the commerce that can be
regulated without the assistance of the necessary and proper
clause, or perhaps at all, yet it might readily be regulated as a

176. Obviously reaching inside states raises federalism issues, but while federalism is
important, the explicit power in the Constitution is to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
several states,” not to protect a rigid version of federalism despite the fact that evolving
commerce among the several states over the years increasingly absorbs once “local” or
“oeconomic” activities. See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107 and Weiler, United, supra
note 171.
177. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (emphasis added).
178. We think that Raich’s growing of marijuana solely for her own medicinal use was
“oeconomy,” the kind of gainful and productive but non-market household activity that
was not understood by the Framers to be commerce, but since has otherwise generally
been largely absorbed by the modern market “economy.” This distinction was well-known
at the Framing and provides an originalist basis for distinguishing what is “commerce” and
what is not, as opposed to the artificial and anachronistic “interstate-intrastate” distinction.
See Weiler, Explaining, supra note 107, at 173–76. Interestingly, the originalist-textualist
Justice Scalia relied on “interstate commerce,” while Justice Holmes, the legal realist, did
not. See supra pp. 460–61 and note 149.
179. A possibility recognized by Balkin, though by another mode of reasoning,
BALKIN, supra note 4, at 160; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 150 and accompanying
text, among others.
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textual and original matter as commerce “among the several
states” with no or little further assistance needed.
This difference in language is important also because even if
the necessary and proper clause can and clearly has extended the
reach of the power over commerce, the Court also can and has set
limits on it. In his majority opinion in the Obamacare case,180
Chief Justice Roberts specifically noted that the “proper” part of
the necessary and proper clause sets limits on the use of the
power.181 Other cases and commentators have also noted that
there are limits on the necessary and proper clause, including
those described in McCulloch.182 Thus if the “affecting interstate
commerce” test is based upon the necessary and proper clause, in
general it could be cut back again, as it was in Lopez, for
exceeding the limits of that clause, much more readily than if the
power over commerce among the states were construed as we
argue the Framers and Marshall understood it. In the latter case,
in general the same activity could possibly be regulated without
resort to the necessary and proper clause at all, simply as
commerce among the several states, and thus not suffer the risk
of exceeding the Court’s limitations on the necessary and proper
clause, or at least be exercised with a more modest use of the
necessary and proper clause less subject to constitutional
criticism.
As noted above,183 the other Lopez Justice, Thomas, rejected
the “affecting interstate commerce” test outright as not being part
of the original understanding, and suggested that if they had
understood “affecting interstate commerce” to be part of the
Constitution, the Framers would have said so.184 But besides
anachronistically arguing that the Framers could have used a term
that would not be invented for another half-century at least, and
begging the question of whether “among the several states” in fact

180. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
181. Id. at 558–61. See also Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 146–47.
182. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420–21. See also Epstein, supra note 77, at
1397–99. Even the liberal Professor Tribe holds that the clause can not be used to regulate
anything with any kind of connection to the delegated powers, but must have a closer
relationship. TRIBE, supra note 156, 801–02.
183. Supra p. 474.
184. Under what Balkin has described as Thomas’s narrow “trade” theory of the
commerce power, the necessary and proper clause is probably needed to regulate nontrade
or noneconomic activity that affects trade or economic activity. BALKIN, supra note 4, at
151, 177.
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meant “interstate,” this also undercuts Thomas’s own argument
because the fact of the absence of “interstate commerce” or, the
historically available words, “between the states” from the
Constitution implies that they were not understood as its meaning
either.185 It is also not clear whether in rejecting the “affecting
commerce” part of the test Thomas was also rejecting any use of
the necessary and proper clause to extend the commerce power,
which would raise additional issues, or just this particular
application.
But to take Thomas’s point seriously for a moment, if
“interstate” and “intrastate” had been invented as words before
1787, instead of many decades later, and despite the fact that the
Framers did not use the equivalent and available term “between,”
and if the Framers nonetheless chose to write “interstate
commerce” into the Constitution, and if they had left it at that,
then Thomas would be right and clearly the power would have
been narrower than we argue is its meaning. But it is also very
possible that, in the unlikely event that the Framers had used
those words, they would also have added additional language
about going inside states for national purposes that would have
been very much like the language Marshall used in Gibbons: “that
commerce that affects more states than one” or the language of
the Virginia Plan.
After all, as Stern, Kmiec, Balkin and others have noted, the
Virginia Plan adopted by the Convention proposed to give the
federal government all the powers needed “to which the states
were separately incompetent.” That language sounds a lot closer
to “that commerce that concerns more states than one” or
“among the several states,” than it is to “interstate commerce.”186
It is also clear that going into the Convention a prime concern was
not only with eliminating state barriers to a national market, but
also state oppression of liberty, especially commercial, both inside
states and at their borders.187 This is not to ignore the various
compromises and needs that led away from some of the broad
powers proposed by the Virginia Plan. But it does show that the
Framers contemplated quite broad national powers that arguably
185. See supra p. 436 and note 13 for more discussion.
186. Virginia Plan (1787), 1 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 20–22 (Philip B. Kurland
& Ralph Lerner eds. 1987); Stern, supra note 126, at 1338–44; Kmiec, supra note 154, at
548, 561–66, 571–75; and BALKIN, supra note 4, at 143–49, among others.
187. See Madison, Vices, supra note 171.
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reached inside states, so that it is not at all clear that even if the
Framers could have adopted “interstate,” they would have limited
the statement of the power in the Constitution over commerce to
that alone, or not added additional language about going inside
states.
In any event, our point is that if more justices were to adopt
Scalia’s or Thomas’s views we would have a greatly diminished
power over commerce based in part on an anachronistic and
arguably narrower replacement of the original English language
in which the Constitution was written. Our point here is not in the
first instance whether this would be good or bad, though we think
the latter, or to naively assume that a conservative Court could
not find other ways to limit the power over commerce, but simply
to note that in theory, at least, any given extension of the power
over commerce among the several states via the affecting
commerce test, or the necessary and proper clause, would usually
be less in extent and hence more defensible than an extension of
“interstate commerce” to the same activity via the same means.
Third, the “interstate-intrastate” dichotomy implicitly favors
state over federal power in a way that “among the several states”
does not. As noted above, the “interstate” framework by
definition leaves vast areas and activities of the country to state
regulation, presumptively anything inside states, and generally
requires help from the necessary and proper clause to reach inside
states. But in addition to this inherent pro-state power bias
implicit in the interstate framework, the Court also often adds
additional federalism protections to its exercise of the power over
commerce among the states.188 Yet arguably, as noted above,189
the purpose of the power to regulate commerce among, i.e.,
inside, the several, i.e., more than one, states, was to overcome
state restrictions and regulate national commerce that was inside
more than one states, and not to regulate only commerce crossing
state borders. The characterization of the constitutional power as
one to regulate “interstate commerce” with additional Tenth
Amendment or other federalism protections thrown in is thus a
double protection for federalism contained within the gloss on the

188. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 564–68 (1995).
189. Supra pp. 432–36 and 495–96 and accompanying notes and notes 171, 173, 176,
and 178.
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language of a power one of whose significant purposes was to
overcome state commercial protectionism and barriers.190
Fourth, for all its linguistic appeal, the textual simplicity and
almost total dominance of “interstate commerce” in
constitutional discourse ironically creates an arguably more
complicated and confusing way of applying the power over
commerce among the several states than might be needed under
the “inside” interpretation of “among the several states.” This is
first because “interstate” actually does only mean “between
states” or “crossing state boundaries,” meanings that, especially
when paired with “intrastate,” as is so frequently done, literally
exclude reaching inside a state unaided. Thus, because of this
literal meaning of “interstate,” in order to reach inside states over
the “intrastate” barrier, as discussed above,191 the Court has
developed several doctrines to extend the “interstate commerce
power” inside states. This in turn justifies opposition by those
opposed to such extensions of power, but also confuses the public
at large more generally over seemingly overly broad and varying
interpretations of the federal power over commerce in order to
reach inside states. 192 As just discussed, this might not be the case,
or be the case less, if the Court stayed with the actual original
American English of the Constitution, which arguably already
meant to go inside states.
In addition, whether or not “among the states” can be proved
to mean “interstate” or “between the states,” those claiming to be
originalist-textualists, like Justice Scalia, or originalists, like
Justice Thomas, undermine the credibility of their own
methodology by working with anachronistic, ersatz language
rather than the actual language of the Constitution.
Finally, the rapid and seemingly unquestioned rise of
“interstate commerce” calls into question the viability of Justice
190. This is not to disparage the importance of federalism, but only to keep it from
gaining an extra advantage by means of a gloss on the Constitutional language.
191. Supra Part IV.B and IV.C.
192. Among many examples that could be given, see Intrastate Commerce Act,
TENTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER
(last
accessed
Jan
26,
2019),
https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/legislation/intrastate-commerce-act/.
Called
“legislation to nullify federal overreach into virtually everything through a distortion of
the “‘Interstate Commerce Clause,’” (emphasis added), the act “provides that ‘[a]ll goods
grown, manufactured or made in (STATE) and all services, performed in (STATE), when
such goods or services are sold, maintained, or retained in (STATE), shall not be subject
to the authority of the Congress of the United States’[.]”
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Scalia’s often made point that the Constitution should not be
amended by “activist”—usually meaning liberal—judges, but only
through the Article V amendment process.193 To the extent that
the replacement of “commerce among the several states” by
“interstate commerce” makes a difference in the interpretation of
the Constitution, which we argue it does, then the Constitution
was amended seamlessly and silently in the 1870’s and 1880’s with
almost no one noticing or objecting then or since, certainly not
among many of those most eagerly propounding “originalist” and
“textualist” interpretation. To be sure, publicly proposing
constitutional changes and putting them on hold while they are
debated and then put up for amendment may be the way
constitutional changes should happen, and may be practical in
situations where there is an overt debate over constitutional
text.194 But when language itself quickly and quietly changes, as is
often the case and is apparently the case here, Scalia’s approach
is quite unrealistic. The United States does not have an Académie
Française analogue for policing the American variety of the
English language; consequently, who has the responsibility or
ability to vigilantly monitor whether a linguistic or semantic
change is being made in the language used to characterize the
meaning and text of the Constitution and then to call a time-out
in that change so that an amendment to the Constitution could be
considered is quite unclear. Moreover, as this study illustrates, the
pace of linguistic change is often so fast that by the time a
constitutional challenge could be made, the Court and the public
may already have adapted to the new words or meanings and
perceive no difficulty with the changed language.195
193. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS
FROM THE BENCH 192 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997). Scalia probably never expected this
argument to apply to conservatives.
194. Though it is not clear how the Court would suggest that an amendment be
considered.
195. Despite Justice Scalia’s criticism of “living constitutionalists” for not changing
constitutional meaning through Article V, the conservative legal movement, of which
Scalia was a central part, does not seem to focus on Article V either. Instead, the
movement has long focused on changing constitutional meaning through developing
conservative scholarship, education, networking, vetting candidates for the bench, and
other means, with little or no observed attention to change through constitutional
amendments. Hollis-Brusky, for example, concludes that “the Federalist Society network
has both (1) shaped the content, direction, and character of constitutional revolutions by
supporting, developing and diffusing intellectual capital to Supreme Court decisionmakers; and (2) helped foster the conditions that facilitate those constitutional revolutions
in the first place by (a) identifying, credentialing, and getting the right kinds of judges and
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V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution says that Congress “shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce among the several states.” It does not say
Congress “shall have power . . . to regulate ‘interstate
commerce.’” Despite this, the actual language of the Constitution,
“commerce among the several states,” long ago disappeared as
the working language of the Court, the legal academy and
apparently of Congress and the public at large—including most
textualists and originalists—and has long performed little more
than a symbolic function, if that.196 In its place, the term
“interstate commerce” (often complemented by “intrastate”)
long ago came to be accepted as a working substitute for and as
the equivalent of the actual words and meaning of the
Constitution. Because “interstate commerce” arguably has a
narrower “between” meaning than the broader “inside” meaning
of the original language of the Constitution, “among,” the

Justices on the bench, (b) acting as a vocal and respected judicial audience to keep those
judges and Justices in check once on the bench, and (c) creating an intellectual and political
climate that is favorable to the desired change by reducing the stigma associated with onceradical ideas or constitutional theories.” But nothing on constitutional amendments.
HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 115, at 7, 152–64. Steven M. Teles also observed nothing
about the constitutional amendment process. Instead, he tells the very political tale of how
“[c]onservatives slowly recognized that they needed to develop their own apparatus for
legal change, one that could challenge legal liberalism in the courts, in classrooms, and in
legal culture.” STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT,
57 (2008). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1988) generated under the supervision of Attorney General Ed Meese as a guide, not to
amending the Constitution through Article V, but to changing the meaning of the
constitution in fifteen areas important to conservatives through careful selection of judicial
nominees.
196. Obviously glosses on constitutional meaning are unavoidable. For example,
Jefferson’s “wall of separation between church and state” is a gloss on the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. To be sure, the “wall” gloss has pulled jurisprudence as
well as public understanding of what “an establishment of religion” actually means toward
the meaning of the gloss. But at least most scholars and judges are well aware of the
difference between the gloss and the actual language of the clause and the influence the
gloss has had: “[t]he difference between the Constitution’s phrase and Jefferson’s is
significant because Jefferson’s has tended to mean so much more.” PHILIP HAMBURGER,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 2 (2002). See also Christopher A. Boyko, A New
Originalism: Adoption of a Grammatical-Interpretive Approach to Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence After District of Columbia v. Heller, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 703, 706-708
(2009). Boyko refers to creation of “supertext,” non-constitutional language that supplants
the Constitutional language. See generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002). We cite these
works not for their substance, but for the point that in this area there is widespread
recognition of the difference between the Constitution and its gloss.
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reliance on “interstate commerce” has both arisen from and
contributed to a narrower understanding of what the power in the
Constitution actually provides than might be justified under the
actual language of the constitution. Moreover, the widespread
acceptance of “interstate commerce” as the equivalent of if not
the actual language of the Constitution has privileged this narrow
understanding. In consequence, to meet many challenges over the
years that Congress and the Court felt required reaching inside
states, the “interstate doctrine” has been supplemented by a
number of corollary doctrines that extend its reach, such as the
“substantially affecting commerce” test and reliance on the
necessary and proper clause. Because these compensatory
doctrines are contested and contestable in themselves, they make
extensions of the “interstate commerce” power less certain and
contribute to or at least reinforce a perception as well as an
argument in some quarters that the Court is overreaching and has
ignored the Constitution. Moreover, these extending doctrines
might not be as necessary or even be necessary at all under what
we would argue is the correct original understanding of
“commerce among the several states.”
Thus we are presented with the oddity—especially in the face
of the recent rise if not dominance of originalist approaches to
interpreting the Constitution—that neologisms invented decades
after the adoption of the Constitution and certainly totally
unknown to the Framers have largely become the primary terms
to express and analyze the Framers’ language as well as to shape
our understanding of the meaning of their language, both on and
off the Court, and even among most originalists, in applying one
of the most important powers in the Constitution, and one for
which ironically the Constitution was originally created. For all
practical purposes, the power “to regulate commerce among the
several states” has become “the interstate commerce power,”
with its narrow connotations, not only on the Court, but in the
academy and the public at large.

